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303	The	UK	Financial	Conduct	Authority	(FCA)	is	now	tasked	with	a	competition	objective	in	addition	to	conduct	regulatory	objectives.		
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generate	better	outcomes	for	consumers.	Markets	are	open	to	entry	and	innovation,	and	
successful,	innovative	firms	thrive,	while	unsuccessful	firms	change	or	exit’.	304	This	quotation	
provides	a	prime	example	of	how	the	market	mentality	is	embedded	within	the	regulatory	
approach	of	the	FCA.	It	explains	how	the	market	ideology	fundamentally	underpins	conduct	
regulation	developed	by	those	at	the	FCA.		
	
Finance	theory		
Although	some	of	the	points	that	follow	are	covered	in	some	depth	in	the	previous	chapter,	
these	points	are	reiterated	here	briefly	so	as	to	contextualise	the	influence	of	finance	theory	in	
this	area.	Within	finance	scholarship,	arguments	that	have	dominated	the	mainstream	finance	
narrative	in	the	run-up	to	the	GFC,	are	built	upon	how	to	resolve	the	most	fundamental	of	
economic	problems	i.e.	how	to	optimally	allocate	scarce	resources.		
	
The	finance	scholarship	that	is	of	particular	relevance	in	the	context	of	these	economic	
arguments,	broadly	fall	into	two	major	categories	-	literature	on	efficient	markets	and	
scholarship	on	modern	portfolio	theory.	Lydenberg	(2011)	305	summarises	the	content	of	these	
arguments	as:	
• ‘Diversification	reduces	risk.	Diversification	offsets	the	risks	of	individual	holdings	and,	
properly	managed,	can	increase	rewards	without	increasing	portfolio-level	risks.	 	
• Rewards	and	risks	are	related.	The	greater	the	risk	taken	by	investors,	the	greater	the	
rewards	they	should	expect.	Money	managers	can	be	deemed	successful	only	if	the	
returns	they	achieve	are	adjusted	for	the	risks	they	take.		
• Markets	are	efficient.	Liquid	and	transparent	markets	reflect	all	information	available	at	
any	given	time	and	hence	price	securities	traded	in	these	markets	appropriately.	 	
• Options	can	be	priced.	Future	rises	and	falls	in	the	price	of	securities	or	markets	can	be	
hedged	against	by	using	options	and	other	derivatives,	for	which	accurate	pricing	
models	are	available’.	
	
How	does	this	affect	financial	regulation?	
Of	these,	the	first	and	third	points	(i.e.	that	markets	are	efficient,	and	that	diversification	is	
beneficial)	are	particularly	relevant	to	this	chapter.	The	reason	these	arguments	are	of	
particular	interest	is	because,	in	financial	markets	–	although	we	might	now	be	accustomed	to	a	
																																																						
304	Financial	Conduct	Authority	website,	About	us	–	Promoting	Competition	section,	[online]	
at	https://www.fca.org.uk/about/promoting-competition	[accessed	on	14th	March	2018]	
305	Lyndenberg,	S.,	(2011),	Beyond	Risk:	Notes	towards	a	more	responsible	investment	theory	in	eds.	Hawley,	J,	Kamath,	S.,	Williams,	
T.,	(2011),	Corporate	Governance	Failures,	University	of	Pennsylvania	Press	
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world	of	regulated	finance	-	the	views	above	and	the	associated	work	of	scholars	such	as	
Fama306	are	often	drawn	upon	to	suggest	that	regulation	can	interfere	with	the	operation	of	
markets	and	create	inefficiencies	in	price	formation.	Avgouleas	(2009)	notes307	that	this	is	then	
translated	into	the	financial	regulation	discourse	as	the	well-acknowledged	mainstream	
narrative	that	regulation	is	only	warranted	for	the	correction	of	irregularities	and	failures	that	
interfere	with	the	functioning	of	markets.	This	explains	the	regulatory	emphasis	-	in	the	UK	
particularly,	but	also	more	globally	–	on	mechanisms	that	promote	disclosure,	transparency	and	
competition	in	turn	allowing	rational	choice	and	competition	and	thereby	ensuring	market	self-
correction	in	rational	markets.	Regulators	are	perceived	to	be	a	pesky	but	necessary	nuisance;	
their	presence	is	only	tolerated	in	circumstances	where	they	allow	market	pre-eminence	to	
regain	its	vaunted	position.		
	
A	narrative	of	‘risk-based’	regulation308	–	particularly	in	the	UK309	–	occupies	the	discourse	
around	the	regulatory	perimeter	(which	entities	fall	under	the	scope	of	regulation),	the	
allocation	of	regulatory	resource	to	various	activities	and	the	evaluation	of	efficiency	and	
effectiveness	of	regulators.310		Risk-based	regulation	aims	to	hold	regulators	to	account	for	the	
scope	of	their	regulatory	activity	and	the	prioritisation	of	their	regulatory	interventions	in	
accordance	with	the	riskiness	of	different	circumstances.311		The	aim	of	risk-based	regulation	is	
to	encourage	regulators	to	focus	their	regulatory	resources	on	those	interventions	that	deal	
with	matters	of	highest	risk	and	to	reduce	the	use	of	resources	on	matters	that	hold	a	lower	risk	
grading.	Risk-based	regulatory	prioritisation	has	been	employed	as	the	rationale	to	eliminate	
regulatory	topics	that	go	beyond	minimal	utilisation	of	resources	so	as	to	be	consistent	with	this	
market	supremacist	narrative.	Nicholls	(2015)	312	explains	this	as	‘A	risk-based	approach	to	
																																																						
306	Fama,	E.,	(1970),	Efficient	Capital	Markets:	A	Review	of	Theory	and	Empirical	Work,	Journal	of	Finance,	25	(2)	pp	383–417	
307	Avgouleas,	E.,	(2009),	The	Global	Financial	Crisis	and	the	Disclosure	Paradigm	in	European	Financial	Regulation:	The	Case	of	
Reform,	European	Company	and	Financial	Law	Review,	Vol.	6,	Issue	4	at		http://heinonline-
org.idpproxy.reading.ac.uk/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/ecomflr6&i=466	[accessed	on	18th	February	2018]	
308 Nicholls,	A.,	(2015),	‘The	Challenges	and	Benefits	of	Risk-Based	Regulation	in	Achieving	Scheme	Outcomes’,	Presentation	to	Actuaries	
Institute	Insurance	Schemes	Seminar,	8-19	Nov	2015,	Adelaide	at	
https://www.actuaries.asn.au/Library/Events/ACS/2015/NichollsRegulation.pdf	[accessed	on	8th	April	2018]	
309	Financial	Services	Authority,	2002,	Building	the	New	Regulator:	Progress	Report	2	pp	5–6.	
310	Black,	J.,	(2005),	‘The	emergence	of	risk-based	regulation	and	the	new	public	risk	management	in	the	United	Kingdom’,	Public	Law,		
2005	Autumn	,	pp	512-549	
311	Baldwin,	R.,	Black,	J.,	(2016),	Driving	Priorities	in	Risk-based	Regulation:	What’s	the	Problem,	Journal	of	Law	and	Society,	Vol	43	
Issue	4	at	https://doi.org/10.1111/jols.12003	[accessed	on	8th	April	2018]	
312	Nicolls,	A.,	(2015),	The	Challenges	and	Benefits	of	Risk-Based	Regulation	in	Achieving	Scheme	Outcomes,	Presentation	to	the	
Actuaries	Institute	Injury	Schemes	Seminar,	8-10	November	2015,	Adelaide	
at	https://www.actuaries.asn.au/Library/Events/ACS/2015/NichollsRegulation.pdf	[accessed	on	15th	August,	2017]	
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regulation	will	focus	on	those	risks	that	hamper	the	delivery	of	public	value	rather	than	
expending	resources	on	ensuring	compliance	to	laws	where	no	real	harm	is	being	done….’.	The	
assessment	of	‘no	real	harm	is	being	done’	is	an	inherently	subjective	and	political	question.		
	
	
Why	is	the	‘risk	to	whom’	question	important?	
Given	the	scale	and	scope	of	the	financial	sector	and	the	question	of	‘risk	to	whom’,	this	question	
of	recognition	of	the	impact	of	risk	beyond	contributors	of	funds,	becomes	particularly	
important.		In	this	context,	it	is	also	worth	pointing	out	at	this	stage	that	the	mainstream	
narrative	of	choice	for,	and	rationality	of,	consumers	has	played	an	important	role	in	the	
discourse	
	
Much	of	this	framing	of	the	rationality	of	consumers	and	the	reframing	of	deregulation	as	
furthering	democracy	and	personal	choice,	has	in	turn	been	drawn	from	the	powerful	
narratives	in	the	wider	economics	and	finance	discourse.	Olsen313	highlights	the	importance	of	
what	is	known	as	the	Chicago	school	(the	term	is	used	for	an	approach	spearheaded	by	
prominent	economists	moulded	in	an	approach	to	economics	instigated	at	the	University	of	
Chicago).	Olsen	argues	that	the:		
	
‘Chicago	school's	turn	towards	deregulation	in	the	post-war	period	was	made	possible	by	a	new	
figure	of	the	‘efficient	consumer,’	a	figure	that	is	positioned	at	the	centre	of	ideational	structures	
….	Emerging	as	early	as	the	1950s,	the	figure	of	the	efficient	consumer	was	central	to	and	
allowed	for	a	new	understanding	of	the	marketplace,	one	that	uncoupled	ideals	of	economic	
efficiency,	utility	and	growth	from	the	promotion	of	democracy	and	moral	behaviour.	As	
Chicago	school	scholars	launched	this	new	ideal	of	the	consumer,	they	also	elevated	the	figure	
into	the	key	actor	in	the	marketplace,	and	mobilized	it	in	discussions	of	efficiency	in	other	
societal	contexts	such	as	the	public	sector.	Altogether,	these	moves	served	to	energize	and	
expand	the	deregulation	discourse.	As	such,	the	efficient	consumer	came	to	function	as	a	key	
dimension	in--as	well	as	a	driver	of--a	large,	complex	and	multidimensional	shift	in	thinking	
about	political	economy.	This	shift	derived	from	the	Chicago	school’.	314	
	
																																																						
313	Olsen,	N.,	(2017),	From	Choice	to	Welfare:	The	Concept	of	the	Consumer	in	the	Chicago	School	of	Economics,	Modern	Intellectual	
History,	08/2017,	Volume	14,	Issue	2	pp	507-535	at	https://doi.org/10.1017/S1479244316000202	[accessed	on	8th	April,	2019]	
314	Olsen,	N.,	(2017),	From	Choice	to	Welfare:	The	Concept	of	the	Consumer	in	the	Chicago	School	of	Economics,	Modern	Intellectual	
History,	08/2017,	Volume	14,	Issue	2	pp	507-535	at	https://doi.org/10.1017/S1479244316000202	[accessed	on	8th	April,	2019]	
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Other	reasons	for	the	importance	of	the	‘risk	to	whom’	question,	lie	in	a	conduct	regulatory	
context	for	a	financial	sector	that	dominates	the	economy	and	is	able	to	re-shape	the	
mainstream	narrative	through	lobbying,	regulatory	capture	and	access	to	vast	funding	sources.	
When	examined	in	conjunction	with	the	literature	on	financialization,	this	also	translates	into	a	
philosophical	pre-disposition	within	risk-based	regulation,	on	risks	to	those	owning	or	
managing	finance	capital	rather	than	on	a	broader	range	of	risks	to	citizens	that	should	be	
evaluated	in	a	holistic	way.	This,	in	turn,	can	cause	severe	stakeholder	detriment	because	the	
impact	of	conduct	risks	on	wider	stakeholders	is	not	captured	effectively	in	regulatory	
evaluations.	This	results	in	poor	regulatory	oversight	and	lopsided	decision-making.	Ireland	
(2011)	and	others	point	out	how	market	ideologies	in	this	area	impact	the	kinds	of	products,	
services	and	behaviours	that	are	considered	permissible.315	Sandel	(2012)	points	out	how	
activities	and	value-based	judgements	that	should	be	outside	of	the	purview	of	financial	
markets	and	market-based	incentives	are	ignorantly	brought	into	their	scope.316	The	broader	
point	to	be	made	here	is	that	this	has	meant	that	regulation	is	viewed	with	much	scepticism	in	
influential	quarters,	and	market-based	solutions	are	prioritised.	The	relevance	of	this	to	our	
consideration	of	the	recalibration	of	conduct	regulation,	is	discussed	later	within	this	chapter	
	
And	returning	to	welfare	economics…..	
Welfare	economics	approaches	build	on	the	understanding	of	the	markets	as	discussed	above,	
but	engage	with	the	reality	of	circumstances	when	the	market	equilibrium	between	supply	and	
demand	functions	does	not	result	in	optimising	the	economically	efficient	allocation	of	
resources.	The	resultant	failure	in	the	allocation	process	–	arising	from	a	breakdown	in	the	
market	mechanism	-		is	discussed	using	the	term	‘market	failure’.317	Ogus	(2004),318	Yeung	and	
Morgan	(2007)319	explain	how	welfare	economics	then	offers	rationales	for	regulation	in	the	
correction	of	such	market	failures.	Note	that	regulatory	intervention	in	markets	is	only	
considered	acceptable	within	the	welfare	economics	paradigm,	as	a	somewhat	‘last-resort’320	
																																																						
315	Ireland,	P.,	(2010)	‘The	Financial	Crisis:	Regulatory	Failure	or	Systems	Failure’	in	MacNeil,	I.,	and	O’Brien,	J.,	(eds.),	The	Future	of	
Financial	Regulation,	Hart	Publishing,	Portland,	2010	
316	Sandel,	M.,,	(2012),	What	Money	Can’t	Buy:	The	Moral	Limits	of	Markets.,		
317	Zimmerman,	E.,	(2011),	Market	Failures,	in	eds.	Badie,	B.,	Berg-Schlosser,	D.,	and	Morlino,	L.,	International	Encyclopedia	of	
Political	Science	(2011),	Vol.	5.	pp	1487-1492,	SAGE	Reference.		
318	Ogus,	A.,	(2004),	Regulation:	Legal	Form	and	Economic	Theory,	Hart	Publishing	
319	Morgan,	B.,	Yeung,	K.,	(2007),	An	introduction	to	law	and	regulation,	Cambridge	University	Press	
320	Scott,	B.,	(2006),	The	Political	Economy	of	Capitalism,	Harvard	Business	School	Faculty	Working	Chapter	(online)		
at	http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/07-037.pdf	[accessed	on	15th	August,	2017]	
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measure	powered	by	the	need	to	prevent	economic	losses	and	ensure	allocative	efficiency	so	
that	‘Pareto-efficient’321	economic	growth	can	be	achieved.322		
	
This	welfare	economics	discourse	is	cast	within	broader	philosophical	perspectives	in	law,	
sociology	and	politics,	on	the	nature	of	the	welfare	state	and	the	role	of	state	intervention	
through	regulation.	Scholars	such	as	Murray	(1984)323	and	Mead	(2006)324		derided	the	welfare	
state	and	offered	the	view	that	the	attributes	and	behaviours	of	individuals	accounted	for	
advantages	and	disadvantages	in	position.	The	pre-eminence	of	such	views	can	be	noted	in	the	
emphasis	on	‘personal	responsibility’	which	came	to	be	cast	as	the	predominant	factor	in	
affecting	inequality,	poverty	and	position	and	is	also	reflected	in	what	Young	(2011)	terms	as	an	
‘ownership’	society.325	There	was	a	stark	de-recognition	of	the	importance	and	nature	of	
structural	factors	in	such	circumstances.	Scholars	such	as	Dworkin	(2000),326	were	more	
committed	to	a	welfare	state.	But	again,	Young	(2011)	points	out	that	they	ignored	structural	
factors.	Instead	they	cast	the	realm	of	welfare	intervention	as	remedying	the	problems	caused	
by	misfortune	or	luck.	327		
	
A	parallel	to	this	can	be	seen	in	the	pre-crisis	regulatory	narrative	in	the	U.K.	where	discussion	
around	regulatory	protections	against	vulnerability	are	built	around	who	is	suffering	
misfortune	(disability,	ill-health)	or	is	on	the	fringes	of	society.	In	a	financial	regulatory	context,	
Crotty	(2009),328	Ireland	(2010)329	have	pointed	out	that	in	the	run-up	to	the	GFC,	the	narrative	
around	financial	regulation	acquired	a	distinctly	neoliberal	flavour.330	This	market-oriented	
																																																						
321	eds	Black,	J,	Hashimzade,	N.,	Myles,	(2017),	A	dictionary	of	economics,	5th	edition,		Oxford	University	Press	(online)	
at	http://www.oxfordreference.com.idpproxy.reading.ac.uk/view/10.1093/acref/9780198759430.001.0001/acref-
9780198759430-e-3814	[accessed	on	17th	August,	2017]	
322		Morgan,	B.,	Yeung,	K.,	(2007),	An	introduction	to	law	and	regulation,	Cambridge	University	Press	
323	Murray,	C.,	(1984),	Losing	Ground:	American	Social	Policy,	1950-1980,	Basic	Books,	New	York	cited	in	Young,	I.	M.,	(2011),	
Responsibility	for	justice,	Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford	
324	Mead,	L.,	(2006),	Beyond	Entitlement:	The	Social	Obligations	of	Citizenship,	Harvard	University	Press,	Cambridge	MA,	cited	in	
Young,	I.	M.,	(2011),	Responsibility	for	justice,	Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford	
325	Young,	I.	M.,	(2011),	Responsibility	for	justice,	Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford	
326	Dworkin,	R.,	(2000),	Sovereign	Virtue:	The	Theory	and	Practice	of	Equality,	Free	Press,	New	York	cited	in	Young,	I.	M.,	(2011),	
Responsibility	for	justice,	Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford	
327	Young,	I.	M.,	(2011),	Responsibility	for	justice,	Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford	
328	Crotty,	J.,	(2009),	‘Structural	causes	of	the	global	financial	crisis:	a	critical	assessment	of	the	new	financial	architecture’,	
Cambridge	Journal	of	Economics,	33,	pp	563-580,	[online],	available	at	
http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/content/33/4/563.full.pdf+html	[accessed	on	24th	November	2016]	
329	Ireland,	P.,	(2010),	‘The	Financial	Crisis:	Regulatory	Failure	or	Systems	Failure’,	The	Future	of	Financial	Regulation,	Hart,	
Portland,	Oregon	
330	Ireland,	P.,	(2010),	‘The	Financial	Crisis:	Regulatory	Failure	or	Systems	Failure’,	The	Future	of	Financial	Regulation,	Hart,	
Portland,	Oregon	
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economic	narrative	–	as	distinct	from	other	narratives	by	critical	political	economy	scholars	or	
those	from	other	subject	areas	such	as	sociology	-	has	been	used	as	the	dominant	and	visible	
description	of	the	rationales	for	regulatory	intervention	in	financial	markets	in	many	Western	
economies,	and	particularly	in	the	UK.331	In	the	UK,	views	from	influential	regulatory	
practitioners	and	scholars	such	as	Davies	meant	that	certain	aspects	of	finance	and	certain	
players,	were	deemed	to	be	legitimately	outside	of	the	purview	of	regulation.332		
	
As	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter	of	this	thesis,	it	has	become	obvious	that	insufficient	
regulatory	attention	was	directed	to	these	issues,	despite	the	damage	that	could	be	caused	to	
other	stakeholders	and	to	the	markets.333	Ferguson	(2012)	explains	how	-		in	the	US	-	in	
influential	regulatory	circles	and	discussions,	such	as	the	Jackson	Hole	Symposium	of	2005,	
alternative	views	that	suggested	that	innovative	financial	products	and	services	may	bring	
disproportionate	risks	to	the	real	economy,	and	that	there	could	be	a	reasonable	alternative	to	
the	unfettered	operation	of	financial	markets,	were	ignored	or	de-emphasised.334	This	is	a	
characteristic	problem	in	the	mainstream	narrative	.335		
	
Encouragingly,	there	has	been	some	recognition	post-crisis	that	financial	vulnerability	is	not	
reserved	for	those	on	the	fringes	of	society	given	the	complexity	of	financial	products	and	
markets.	For	many	citizens,	it	is	likely	that	there	elapses	a	long	period	of	time	from	when	the	
product	is	sold	to	us	and	when	the	product	is	found	to		be	improperly	sold	or	unviable	for	a	
range	of	reasons	including	the	inability	of	the	financial	firm	to	meet	its	liability.336	It	is	however	
worth	noting,	that	despite	this	recognition,	the	wider	discussion	of	regulatory	reform	is	mainly	
structured	around	welfare	economics	rationales.337	The	emphasis	therefore	still	remains	on	
																																																						
331	Harnay,	S.,	(2016),	The	influence	of	the	economic	approaches	to	regulation	on	banking	regulations:	a	short	history	of	banking	
regulations,	Cambridge	Journal	of	Economics,	Vol	40,	Issue	2,	pp	401-426	
	
332Davies,	H.,	(2010),	“Consenting	adults	in	private,	that’s	their	problem	really”	quoted	from	Davies,	H.,	‘Naive,	but	Not	Corrupt’,	
Slate.com	article	dated	26th	December	2010	[online]	at	
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/project_syndicate/2010/12/naive_but_not_corrupt.html	[accessed	on	17th	November	
2017]	
333	Ireland,	P.,	(2010),	‘The	Financial	Crisis:	Regulatory	Failure	or	Systems	Failure’,	The	Future	of	Financial	Regulation,	Hart,	
Portland,	Oregon	
334	Ferguson,	C.,	(2012),	Inside	Job:	The	Financiers	Who	Pulled	Off	The	Heist	Of	The	Century,	Oneworld	Publications	
335	Rajan,	R.	(2005),	Has	Financial	Development	Made	the	World	Riskier,	Speech	at	Jackson	Hole	Symposium	(online)	at	
https://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2005/pdf/rajan2005.pdf	[accessed	on	17th	November	2017]	
336	Financial	Conduct	Authority	(2015),	Consumer	Vulnerability,	Occasional	Chapter	No.	8	[Online]	
at	https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/occasional-chapters/occasional-chapter-8-exec-summary.pdf	[accessed	on	16th	March	
2018]	
337	Harnay,	S.,	(2016),	The	influence	of	the	economic	approaches	to	regulation	on	banking	regulations:	a	short	history	of	banking	
regulations,	Cambridge	Journal	of	Economics,	Vol	40,	Issue	2,	pp	401-426	
	 87	
individuals	taking	personal	responsibility	for	financial	decisions	that	are	then	made	in	such	
markets	that	operate	in	an	environment	that	has	implemented	regulatory	remedies	for	market	
failure.	This	harks	back	to	points	previously	made	about	the	approaches	to	economics	being	
influenced	by	the	Chicago	school,	emphasising	rationality	of	consumers	and	the	need	to	allow	
consumers	to	make	choices.	338		Welfare	economics	rationales	have	not	just	dominated	
regulatory	policy-making	and	rationales	for	regulation	before	the	GFC339	but	have	also	formed	
the	overt	or	covert	basis	particularly	in	the	UK,	US	and	much	of	Western	Europe	for	regulatory	
reforms	and	discourse	post-GFC.340	Regulatory	rationales	were,	and	continue	to	be	shaped	by	a	
‘marketised’,	financialised	language	that	engages	with	terms	such	as	cost-benefit	analyses,	
competition,	incentives,	disincentives	and	efficiency	gains	in	the	assessment	of	the	rationale	or	
value	of	regulation.	This	again	plays	to	the	ideas	of	democracy,	personal	freedom,	choice	and	
rationality	drawn	from	influence	of	the	neoliberal	perspectives	on	economics	of	the	Chicago	
school.	Scholars	such	as	Young	(2011),341	Feintuck	(2010),342	Harnay	(2011),343	Palley(2007)344		
and	Ireland	(2011)345	explain	how	values,	quality,	justice,	fairness	or	equality	have	been	
abrogated	from	the	regulatory	discourse	as	a	result.346	Engelen	et	al	(2011)	explain	how	the	role	
of	innovation	in	finance	is	overemphasised	in	this	discourse,	without	an	appropriate	estimation	
of	the	consequences	of	such	innovation.347		
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Within	this	narrative	there	is	little	room	for	a	credible	discussion	of	regulation	calibrated	
around	social	norms	and	ethics.	Instead	where	there	is	an	acceptance	of	societal	objectives	such	
as	justice	and	equity	as	goals	within	regulation,	the	solutions	that	are	considered	are	allied	to	
the	‘trickle-down’	effect.	There	has	therefore	been	significant	scholarly	scepticism	of	these	
arguments,	outside	of	the	‘neo-liberal’348	finance	and	economics	discourse.	Ireland	(2010),	
points	to	fallacies	in	the	‘neoliberal’	approach	to	economics	that	simultaneously	justify	and	
constrain	regulatory	activities,	and	seem	to	have	an	idealistic	focus	on	the	primacy	of	individual	
choice	and	an	unhealthy	reliance	on	a	trickle-down	approach	to	societal	betterment	when	the	
evidence	in	relation	to	important	areas	such	as	inequality	and	unfair	treatment	is	clearly	to	the	
contrary,	as	particularly	evidenced	by	the	GFC.349	Avgouleas	(2009)350	and	Young	(2011)351	
explain	how	regulatory	priorities,	in	finance,	predicated	on	tenets	of	personal	responsibility	and	
market	hegemony,	protect	societal	stakeholders	in	a	very	circumscribed	manner352		and	fail	to	
engage	with	core	democratic	values	(such	as	justice	and	equality)	and	real	economic	
implications	of	misconduct	in	finance.	This	emerging	scepticism	has	helped	develop	regulatory	
practice	and	provide	a	platform	for	critical	regulatory	discourse,	particularly	in	the	aftermath	of	
the	GFC.	The	arguments	above	are	of	importance	to	this	chapter	because	regulatory	scope	and	
accountability	have	currently	largely	been	calibrated	in	accordance	with	many	aspects	of	this	
marketised	philosophical	outlook.	This	chapter	suggests	a	revision	to	the	approach	to	conduct	
regulation	to	engage	better	with	such	fundamental	objectives.		
	
Substantive	political	approaches	
Substantive	political	motives		for	regulation	focus	on	a	range	of	‘non-economic	substantive	goals	
that	justify	regulatory	intervention’.353	Regulation	justified	by	substantive	political	rationales	
engages	with	the	needs	for	fairness,	equity,	justice,	socially	motivated	redistribution,	
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paternalism	or	the	formation	of	diverse	preferences	and	shared	social	values.354	It	takes	account	
of	factors	such	as	irreversibility,	or	fairness	to	future	generations	whose	views	are	not	reflected	
in	current	economic	demand	and	supply	interactions.	It	may	also	reflect	consideration	of	those	
who	are	unable	to	participate	in	the	market	i.e.	those	who	–	although	they	may	have	a	valid	view	
or	concern	-	lack	power	or	representation	at	the	right	time	in	the	right	currency	and	in	the	right	
forum	to	express	concerns	or	alternative	demand	functions.			
	
Examples	of	the	use	of	substantive	political	approaches	include	regulations	for	the	prevention	
of	usury,	speculation	or	gambling	in	certain	jurisdictions	which	may	arise	from	shared	social	
values	that	reflect	the	relevant	society’s	abhorrence	of	such	practices	on	ethical	or	moral	
grounds.	Conly	(2013)	describing	another	practical	example	of	such	a	substantive	political	
rationale	(the	importance	of	coercive	paternalism)355	shows	how	patients	may	rigorously	check	
the	internet	or	other	sources	to	find	out	the	causes	of	their	symptoms,	and	may	be	self-confident	
in	their	diagnosis	but	are	prevented	-	by	regulation	-	from	getting	certain	drugs	unless	it	is	
prescribed	by	a	registered	medical	practitioner.	These	regulatory	safeguards	supplant	the	
market	mechanism	with	price	at	its	core.	Safeguards	instead	may	stem	from	concerns	about	
new	or	more	appropriate	medication	being	available,	side	effects,	contraindications	arising	
from	family	history	or	other	factors.		Conly	explains	that	in	such	cases,	society	agrees	that	
‘expert	knowledge	is	necessary	and	available,	and	we	are	thus,	on	the	whole,	better	off	having	
the	decision	taken	out	of	our	hands’.356		
	
Substantive	political	approaches	(although	they	do	not	arise	simply	to	correct	failings	of	
economic	theory)	may	also	help	to	provide	a	different	way	to	address	failures	by	the	market	to	
address	issues	such	as	adverse	selection,	collective	action	problems	or	free	rider	concerns.		
	
Why	is	the	focus	on	substantive	political	approaches	important	to	this	chapter?		
Substantive	political	approaches	engage	with	concerns	about	societal	priorities	that	are	
consistent	with	notions	of	freedom,	equality	and	justice.	Such	approaches	are	central	to	
democratic	ideals	that	have	largely	been	ignored	-	or	as	in	the	case	of	arguments	drawn	from	
the	Chicago	school,	have	been	misappropriated357	to	pursue	outcomes	inconsistent	with	
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democracy	-		in	the	regulatory	discourse.358	The	inordinate	emphasis	on	market-driven	
outcomes	within	the	Chicago	characterisation	has	meant	that	political	citizenship	is	derived	
from	and	associated	with	economic	power	and	citizenship,	rather	than	from	the	fundamental	
rights	afforded	within	a	democracy.		
	
In	modern	economies,	financial	markets	are	the	fulcrum	for	the	agglomeration	and	allocation	of	
capital.	Particularly	given	the	retreat	of	state	provision,	citizens	in	developed	economies	find	
that	the	use	of	financial	products	and	financial	intermediaries	are	woven	into	the	very	fabric	of	
their	day-to-day	lives	ranging	from	the	mundaneness	of	booking	of	a	train	or	bus	ticket	through	
to	more	complex	health	or	personal	care	provision.359	The	extent	of	the	financial	sector’s	
powers	to	provide	or	to	withhold	access	to	other	non-financial	goods	and	services,	to	allocate	
capital	and	to	redistribute	associated	income360		evoke	the	need	for	fairness	and	social	justice	
considerations	in	any	economy.	
	
However,	for	many	financial	products,	such	as	pensions,	insurance	and	investment	products	
there	is	a	layer	of	complexity	in	assessment	and	a	material	time	lag	between	the	purchase	of	the	
product	and	any	real	attempt	by	the	consumer	to	test	its	efficacy	through	use.	With	products	
such	as	life	insurance,	the	ability	to	check	whether	the	product	pays	out	may	not	actually	be	in	
one’s	own	lifetime.	Indeed,	the	construction	of	the	corporation	and	the	engineering	around	
many	financial	products	add	a	layer	of	complexity	in	judging	anyone	outside	the	firm	selling	the	
product	knowing	whether	it	might	be	worth	purchasing.	This	complexity	is	thus	further	
exacerbated	by	the	challenges	posed	by	information	asymmetry.	Many	financial	consumers	
know	comparatively	little	about	financial	products	relative	to	the	manufacturers	of	complex	
financial	products	and	services.		
	
In	the	tradition	of	positivism,361	the	narrative	of	financial	regulation,	(particularly	prior	to	the	
global	financial	crisis)	has	been	dominated	by	arguments	that	suggested	that	the	use	of	financial	
market	mechanisms	and	techniques	to	underpin	various	financial	and	non-financial	decisions	
was	a	value-neutral	proposition.	That	these	are	underpinned	by	socio-political	and	economic	
assumptions	and	choices,	was	and	continues	to	be	largely	ignored.	The	neoliberal	state	
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encourages	regulators	to	engage	with	the	notion	of	a	financial	‘consumer’	by	using	the	language	
of	personal	freedom	and	choice	in	such	a	framing,	and	this	helps	provide	a	basis	for	regulators	
to	see	themselves	as	mainly	being	in	the	position	of	preventing	individuals	from	benefitting	
from	moral	hazard.	When	considering	financial	capability,	this	focus	on	the	notion	of	citizen	as	
consumer	results	in	many	regulators	using	their	financial	capability	budgets	to	focus	on	
formulating	regulation	enabling	citizens	to	engage	as	responsible	consumers.362	Regulators	are	
inclined	to	emphasise	the	need	for	such	a	consumer	to	take	responsibility	for	various	aspects	of	
financial	provision	as	one	would	expect	such	consumers	to	make	rational	choices	in	a	
competitive	market.	363		Vulnerable	consumers	are	broadly	conceived	as	only	comprising	the	
weakest	who	live	on	the	fringes	of	society.	The	assumption	–	that	is	unstated	but	broadly	
prevalent	–	is	that	the	vast	majority	of	citizens	are	portrayed	as	consumers	who	are	rational	and	
able	to	engage	with	such	complex	products	and	to	make	rational	choices.	Standard	regulatory	
tools	deployed	in	this	context	are	those	predicated	on	disclosure	and	transparency,364	which	
have	been	proven	(as	in	the	previous	chapter	about	the	Global	Financial	Crisis)	to	fail	to	address	
the	information	asymmetry	problems	or	other	behavioural	biases	that	plague	financial	decision-
making	across	a	broad	swathe	of	the	population	in	a	sufficiently	effective	manner.	Due	to	the	
ubiquity	of	financial	products	in	everyday	use,	their	complexity	and	the	lag-time	to	problem	
discovery	amongst	other	factors,	this	problem	is	multiplied	manifold	and	the	impact	is	not	
limited	to	the	so-called	vulnerable.	
	
The	resurgence	of	the	study	of	behavioural	finance	post-crisis,	has	made	some	dent	in	the	
assumptions	of	rationality	present	in	the	wider	financial	discourse,	but	has	largely	been	
diverted365	to	engage	with	issues	at	the	fringe	of	regulation	such	as	the	use	of	‘nudge’-	
economics	in	the	development	of	certain	policy	tools	which	allow	consumers	to	make	better	
choices,	with	incentives	or	engagement,	with	modifying	consumer	consumption	behaviour	and	
also	on	the	market	conduct	side	with	whether	engaging	with	ESG	factors	improves	financial	
returns	to	portfolios	for	investors,	again	casting	citizens	who	deserve	financial	regulatory	
protections	as	only	those	who	have	sufficient	access	to	financial	capital.	Regulatory	intervention	
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is	largely	predicated	on	restoring	market	supremacy	within	the	existing	paradigm	of	welfare	
economics	by	adjusting	levers	in	moderate	ways	to	promote	competition	and	root	out	cases	of	
serious	abuse.	There	is	little	engagement	with	the	core	subtext	of	the	substantive	political	
discussions	of	financial	regulation	i.e.	that	there	might	be	motives	other	than	market	primacy	
such	as	fairness	and	justice,	that	might	drive	financial	regulatory	activities	in	relation	to	the	
conduct	of	financial	intermediaries	and	in	the	design,	manufacture,	marketing,	sales,	after-sales	
and	retirement	of	financial	products	and	services.	
	
Another	key	area	affecting	the	role	and	remit	of	financial	regulation	more	generally	and	conduct	
regulation	more	specifically	is	financialization.	Epstein	(2005)	defines	financialization	broadly	
as	‘the	increasing	role	of	financial	motives,	financial	markets,	financial	actors	and	financial	
institutions	in	the	operation	of	the	domestic	and	international	economies’.366		Krippner	explains	
that	financialization	refers	to	a	‘pattern	or	accumulation	in	which	profit	making	occurs	
increasingly	through	financial	channels	rather	than	through	trade	and	commodity	
production’.367	Palley	(2007)	notes	that	‘financialization	operates	through	three	different	
conduits:	changes	in	the	structure	and	operation	of	financial	markets;	changes	in	the	behavior	
of	non-financial	corporations,	and	changes	in	economic	policy’.368	
	
Instruments	to	encourage	corporate	and	consumer	indebtedness	are	engineered	through	
‘steady	financial	innovation	that	ensures	a	flow	of	new	financial	products	allowing	increased	
leverage	and	widening	the	range	of	assets	that	can	be	collateralized’.	369	Non-financial	
corporations	are	increasingly	affected	by	these	financial	machinations	as	they	are	increasingly	
dependent	upon	and	judged	by	ever	more	impatient	and	complex	financial	markets.	Managers	
in	financial	and	non-financial	firms	are	judged	by	the	yardstick	of	their	visible	performance	in	
financial	markets	–	there	is	an	ideological	dominance	of	investor	primacy	resulting	in	an	
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inordinate	focus	on	the	interest	of	capital	providers	and	financial	performance.	Competition	–	
even	in	the	non-financial	sector	–	is	therefore	eased	away	from	productive	innovation.	Instead	
managers	are	forced	to	compete	by	adopting	innovative	approaches	to	showcasing	financial	
performance	(not	all	of	which	are	legitimate	–	a	prime	example	of	this	is	Enron370)	or	through	
financial	wizardry	using	the	proliferation	of	derivatives	and	other	instruments.	While	these	
products	at	times	have	a	real	economic	purpose,	at	many	others,	they	are	used	for	creating	or	
showcasing	returns	to	capital	providers,	needlessly	embroiling	non-financial	firms	in	financial	
activities	that	would	be	secondary	to	any	assessment	of	productive	performance	in	satisfying	
real	economic	needs.	Studies	such	as	Ceccheti	and	Kharroubi371	(2014)	show	that	rapid	financial	
sector	growth	can	‘crowd	out	real	economic	growth’,	financial	development	affects	aggregate	
productivity	growth	and	concluded	that	the	level	of	financial	development	is	good	only	up	to	a	
point,	after	which	it	becomes	a	drag	on	growth,	and	that	a	fast-growing	financial	sector	is	
detrimental	to	aggregate	productivity	growth.		
	
Complexity	and	opacity	in	financial	products	magnifies	risk	within	the	financial	system	and	the	
interconnectedness	with	the	real	economy	results	in	highly	adverse	societal	impact.	Crotty	
(2007)	also	avers	that	financialization	results	in	a	transfer	of	power	to	the	financial	sector.		
	
Van	der	Zwan	(2015),	describing	the	scholarly	studies	of	financialization	across	subject	areas	
including	anthropology,	economics,	political	science,	sociology	and	geography	explains	how	
these	diverse	perspectives	are	brought	together	by	the	recognition	that	finance	is	not	just	a	
capital	provider	for	economic	purposes.	‘Instead,	studies	of	financialization	interrogate	how	an	
increasingly	autonomous	realm	of	global	finance	has	altered	the	underlying	logics	of	the	
industrial	economy	and	the	inner	workings	of	democratic	society’.372	
	
Epstein	(2005)373	has	evidenced	how	financialization	(often	intertwined	with	neoliberalism)	
can	account	for	a	persistent	enrichment	of	financiers,	typically	at	the	expense	of	other	
stakeholders	in	the	real	economy.	The	financial	sector	shapes	politics	through	lobbying	and	
campaign	contributions,	business	through	fostering	debt-driven	business	cycles	and	the	sector	
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also	artificially	inflates	aggregate	demand	by	supporting	consumer	spending	through	easily-
obtained	credit	facilities	of	dubious	value.		Palley	(2007)	explains	how	financial	markets,	
institutions	and	elites	exert	control	over	economic	policy	and	economic	outcomes.	Within	the	
economy,	the	financial	sector	gains	precedence	and	importance	over	the	real	sector.	Wealth	is	
extracted	from	the	real	economic	production	and	fuels	the	financial	sector	instead.	Increasing	
proportions	of	income	leading	to	increasing	inequality	between	financial	elites	and	those	
producing	real	goods	and	services,	thus	contributing	to	wage	stagnation	or	erosion	within	the	
productive	part	of	the	economy.	Palley	notes	that	‘…	there	are	reasons	to	believe	that	
financialization	may	render	the	economy	prone	to	risk	of	debt-	deflation	and	prolonged	
recession’.		
Financialization	is	directly	related	to	greater	moral	hazard	and	increases	in	financiers’	
propensity	to	take	risk	without	being	accountable	for	their	actions.	It	causes	an	artificial	
distortion	in	asset	prices	that	prevents	the	appropriate	interaction	of	aggregate	demand	and	
supply	functions	to	determine	price	in	the	market	mechanism.	Lydenberg	(2011)	points	out	that	
such	an	emphasis	on	financial	performance	to	the	exclusion	of	the	consideration	of	the	role	of	
assets	in	addressing	real	economic	needs	has	also	resulted	in	a	change	in	the	fundamental	
nature	of	asset	classes	and	undermined	the	reliability	of	the	price	mechanism	in	valuing	those	
assets	effectively.	He	notes	that	while	successful	investing	is	really	about	the	focus	on	
‘maximizing	the	societal	benefits	that	each	asset	class	is	intended	to	create,	while	achieving	
competitive	financial	returns,’374	in	economies	overshadowed	by	financialization,	investors	and	
managers	are	encouraged	to	maximize	financial	performance	with	little	reference	to	the	societal	
benefits	generated	from	the	assets.	For	example,	property	in	many	big,	international	cities	such	
as	London,	is	no	longer	valued	by	markets	in	relation	to	the	demand	and	supply	functions	of	
serving	the	real	economic	need	of	providing	housing.	Instead	its	value	is	heavily	influenced	by	
speculative	investment	activities	of	those	who	neither	intend	nor	are	expected	to	ever	use	it	for	
providing	shelter,	or	a	home.	The	price	mechanism	is	therefore	no	longer	able	to	efficiently	
allocate	scarce	economic	resources	efficiently	in	a	manner	that	is	consistent	with	societal	needs.		
Incentives	and	requirements	for	directors	and	managers	of	corporations	are	restructured	to	
suit	this	new	paradigm.	Less	attention	is	paid	to	product	or	service	quality,	or	fair	wages	to	
labour.	Instead	the	focus	is	on	reportable	financial	performance	with	an	inordinate	focus	on	
short-term	returns.	This	naturally	results	in	a	decrease	in	real	investment,	because	the	financial	
markets	offer	more	lucrative	returns.	Leverage	is	used	by	managers	to	maintain	returns	to	
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equity.	In	parallel,	the	aggregate	demand	function	is	artificially	inflated	by	greater	
financialization	as	a	result	of	the	lax	approach	to	easy	consumer	credit.	This	inflationary	spiral	
in	turn	engenders	greater	and	greater	indebtedness.	Society	and	the	real	economy	are	thus	
recalibrated	to	serve	finance,	rather	than	finance	serving	purposefully	in	enabling	the	real	
economy	to	serve	societal	needs.		Egregious	behaviours	have	resulted	in	significant	direct	and	
indirect	hardships	to	civil	society	as	has	been	evidenced	both	in	the	past	and	more	recently	by	
the	relevations	within	the	Panama	Papers	scandal.375		
	
Specifically,	in	respect	of	reforming	conduct	regulation,	these	substantive	political	rationales	
therefore	become	important	because	there	may	be	structural	solutions	that	need	to	be	put	in	
place	or	instances	when	regulators	should	intervene	to	address	systemic	weaknesses	in	conduct	
which	are	susceptible	to	contagion.	Essentially	many	of	the	implications	of	misconduct	bring	
into	question	the	structures	that	perpetuate	disadvantage	in	the	guise	of	choice	and	personal	
responsibility.	Examples	include	co-location	and	payday	loans.	To	these	issues,	competition	and	
the	market	mechanism	do	not	provide	a	suitable	answer.	Instead,	a	clearer	understanding	of	the	
systemic	dynamics	that	entrench	weakness	and	reward	misconduct	are	required.	As	Anderson	
(1999)	points	out	in	her	seminal	essay:	‘One’s	capabilities	are	a	function	not	just	of	one’s	fixed	
personal	traits	and	divisible	resources,	but	of	one’s	mutable	traits,	social	relations	and	norms,	
and	the	structure	of	opportunities,	public	goods	and	public	spaces’.376	This	is	particularly	
important	in	the	context	of	financial	regulation	because	regulatory	structures,	interventions	and	
the	structure	of	financial	markets	–	particularly	in	the	context	of	financialization	–	can	have	a	
significant	impact	on	addressing	or	exacerbating	structural	advantages	and	disadvantages	
thereby	increasing	inequality	and	reducing	the	effectiveness	of	competition	and	rational	choice	
as	tools	for	remedy.	
	
Section	4	
	
Prudential	and	Conduct	Regulation:	Scope	and	application	
This	segment	of	the	chapter	explains	how	one	of	the	key	corrections	to	the	regulatory	discourse	
and	practice	around	prudential	regulation	post-GFC,	should	also	be	extended	to	conduct	
regulation.		
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Prudential	regulation	is	intended	to	ensure	safety	and	soundness	of	regulated	entities	and	
markets,	whilst	conduct	regulation	attends	to	the	conduct	exhibited	by	regulated	entities	when	
engaging	with	consumers	and	markets.	In	practice,	financial	regulators	may	also	be	mandated	
with	allied	responsibilities	such	as	the	oversight	of	payment	systems	and	competition,	the	
prevention	of	financial	crime,	enhancement	of	international	cooperation	and	specific	mandates	
such	as	the	promotion	of	the	domestic	financial	markets.	Current	approaches	to	prudential	
regulation	can	be	classified	into	micro-prudential	regulation	and	macro-prudential	regulation.		
	
The	dominant	discourse	and	structural	arrangements	of	prominent	regulators	including	the	UK	
FSA,	prior	to	the	GFC	were	largely	within	the	micro-prudential	regulatory	space.	The	term	
‘micro-prudential’	regulation	refers	to	regulatory	activities	that	oversee	the	financial	viability	of	
individual	regulated	entities	or	groups,	thus	seeking	to	ensure	the	soundness	of	these	entities	at	
a	‘micro’	i.e.	individual	regulated	entity	level.	The	object	is	to	ensure	that	micro-prudentially	
regulated	entities	are	able	to	honour	financial	claims,	as	they	fall	due;	or	that	recovery	plans	can	
be	initiated	or	the	entity	can	be	unwound	in	an	orderly	manner	in	case	of	distress.	A	key	focus	of	
these	efforts	is	to	minimise	the	reliance	on	the	public	purse	from	the	failure	of	a	regulated	
entity,	or	the	creation	of	financial	instability	arising	from	the	unwinding	of	a	failed	entity	/	
group.	Within	the	literature,	influential	justifications	for	micro-prudential	regulation,	such	as	
that	provided	by	Llewelyn	(1999),	are	primarily	drawn	from	the	economic	rationales	for	
regulation.377		
	
Macro-prudential	regulation	–	although	discussed	formally	since	at	least	the	1980s	-	only	
achieved	significant	policy	prominence	in	the	UK	in	the	aftermath	of	the	GFC.	The	glaring	
absence	of	structures	to	support	and	enable	macro-prudential	regulatory	activities,	although	
macro-prudential	regulation	as	a	concept	was	clearly	discussed	by	influential	regulatory	
practitioners378	is	noteworthy	at	this	stage.	The	following	segment	explains	the	nature	and	
rationales	for	the	adoption	of	macro-prudential	regulation	post-crisis.		
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Post-GFC	it	was	recognised	that	systemic	risk	could	not	merely	be	addressed	through	micro-
prudential	regulation	alone.	There	was	a	growing	understanding	that	the	micro-prudential	
toolkit	did	not	have	the	necessary	mechanisms	to	address	broader	issues	arising	from	
contagion.	Macro-prudential	regulation	is	aimed	at	ensuring	the	safety	and	soundness	of	the	UK	
financial	system	at	a	more	holistic	level.	It	‘takes	into	account	the	interactions	among	individual	
financial	institutions,	as	well	as	the	feedback	loops	of	the	financial	sector	with	the	real	economy,	
including	the	costs	that	systemic	risk	entails	in	terms	of	output	losses’.379	It	is	worth	noting	at	
this	stage	–	as	is	evident	from	the	quote	above	-		that	macro-prudential	regulation	is	also	largely	
justified	in	the	literature	using	a	financialised	narrative	predicated	on	the	economic	rationales	
for	regulation.	This	narrative	describes	the	costs	to	the	public	purse	from	systemic	risks.	It	is	
macroprudential	regulation	within	the	broader	heading	of	prudential	regulation	that	is	of	
particular	interest	to	the	development	of	parallel	arguments	in	relation	to	macro-conduct	
regulation,	although	substantive	political	rationales	for	regulation	in	addition	to	economic	
rationales	will	be	adopted	to	develop	these	parallel	arguments.		
	
Conduct	regulation	–	in	its	current	form	-	is	typically	described	in	the	UK,	as	consisting	of	the	
regulation	of	market	conduct	and,	a	‘consumer	protection’	agenda.	This	nomenclature	is	termed	
vague	because	it	ignores	the	notion	that	consumer	protection	more	generally	could	be	a	valid	
motive	for	prudential	regulation	too,	but	is	used	particularly	in	the	UK	to	refer	solely	to	those	
elements	of	conduct	regulation	that	engage	with	protecting	both	retail	and	wholesale	
consumers.	The	regulation	of	market	conduct	alongside	issues	of	investor	and	consumer	
protection	are	fairly	well	described380	in	the	literature.		
	
Literature	in	the	areas	of	market	integrity	and	investor	protection	largely	engages	with	
regulatory	protections	through	the	market	mechanism	with	solutions	such	as	greater	and	
better-quality	disclosure	to	investors,	management	of	conflicts	of	interest,	increased	
transparency,	creating	a	level	playing	field	through	addressing	activities	such	as	insider	trading,	
front-running	etc,	and	so	on,	providing	the	remedy	for	market	failure381.	Although	less	well-
described	in	the	finance	literature,	there	has	been	an	increasing	trend	(even	pre-GFC,	but	
particularly	after	the	GFC)	to	look	beyond	the	pure	investor	protection	aspects	of	conduct	
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regulation	and	grapple	with	the	protection	of	a	wider	set	of	consumers.382	In	practice,	in	the	UK	
this	has	resulted	in	a	well-developed	consumer	protection	agenda	that	goes	beyond	solely	
investor-protection	facets	and	includes	a	range	of	regulations	that	span	the	product	and	
consumption	life	cycles	such	as	design,	pre-sales,	marketing	processes,	service	and	complaints,	
client	classification,	client	money,	client	reporting,	product	review,	protection	of	vulnerable	
consumers	etc.	Some	of	these	topics	such	as	the	protection	of	vulnerable	consumers	have	gone	
beyond	the	narrow	confines	of	simply	correcting	market	failures,	but	have	intentionally383	not	
engaged	with	the	substantive	political	rationales	for	regulation.		
	
It	is	worth	making	a	small	digression	here	to	quickly	recap	some	of	the	concerns	regarding	the	
use	of	an	allied	economic	theory	termed	the	‘trickle-down’	theory,	that	underpins	the	
arguments	in	the	primacy	of	markets	school	of	thought	in	much	of	Anglo-Saxon	approaches	to	
financial	regulation	384.		As	mentioned	in	the	previous	chapter,	the	‘trickle-down’	effect	has	been	
described	coarsely	by	the	economist	J	K	Galbraith	as	the	view	that	‘If	you	feed	the	horse	enough	
oats,	some	will	pass	through	to	the	road	for	the	sparrows’.385	The	idea	is	that	if	those	at	the	top	
do	well,	businesses	and	individual	further	down	the	chain	will	benefit	from	their	spending	and	
largesse.	It	has	been	applied	to	markets	more	generally	and	financial	regulation	more	
particularly	because	the	trickle-down	approach	to	regulation	more	generally	and	to	the	conduct	
regulation	agenda	more	specifically,	because	within	a	financialised	discourse	the	market	
construct	is	central,	and	the	broader	objective	of	welfare	enhancement,	is	achieved	through	
primarily	protecting	the	providers	of	capital	and	ensuring	the	integrity	of	the	market	
mechanism	as	a	source	of	price	discovery.		To	a	more	tangential	extent,	there	is	the	allied	aim	of	
preventing	claims	on	the	state	caused	by	the	collapse	of	regulated	firms.	Regulation	–	in	this	
view	-	is	aimed	at	protecting	investors	and	shareholders	(ie	the	capital	providers).	This	in	turn,	
allows	their	capital	to	be	employed	in	productive	ways	engendering	growth	and	productivity	
thereby	allowing	the	rising	tide	to	lift	all	boats.	On	account	of	the	primacy	of	markets,	Anglo-
Saxon	conduct	regulation	literature	has	therefore	been	concerned	with	ensuring	that	regulated	
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financial	entities	can	honour	their	claims	(or	be	unwound	effectively),	that	investors	are	
protected	and	that	the	market	has	integrity.		
	
Although	the	trickle-down	effect	is	contradicted	by	large	amounts	of	evidence386	in	practice,	
notably	by	campaigns	for	tax	justice,387	it	remains	an	implicit,	largely	hidden	and	under-
examined	basis	for	much	discourse	within	the	market	paradigm.	Consequently	it	is	often	taken	
for	granted	and	provides	subtle	underpinnings	for	many	of	the	deliberations	on	the	rationales	
for	conduct	regulation.	The	effect	of	employing	trickle-down	economics	in	market-based	
approaches	to	regulation	is	that	there	is	an	implicit	and	pervasive	view	in	many	of	the	
arguments	for	regulation,	that	wrongly	conflates	the	protection	of	the	financial	well-being	of	the	
firm	and	of	its	capital	providers	with	what	is	the	right	regulatory	course	of	action	to	protect	
societal	stakeholders.	Regulation	is	justified	by	the	argument	that	if	investors	are	protected,	this	
will	allow	them	to	make	capital	commitments.	Investor	returns	are	re-distributed	from	a	
societal	welfare	standpoint	through	the	trickling	down	within	society	of	the	effects	of	their	
investment	making	society	as	a	whole	better	off	through	the	increased	production	and	through	
the	wealth	distribution	in	society	by	the	spending	of	investors.	But	the	protection	of	consumers	
when	seen	through	the	‘trickle-down’	lens	is	justified	by	consumers’	ability	and	willingness	to	
participate	in	markets	and	buy	/	consume	the	financial	products	that	the	investors	have	
contributed	to	generating.388	Note	that	this	still	lies	within	the	financialised	paradigm	of	
counting	consumers	and	investors	(ie	those	with	the	means	and	ability	to	participate	in	
financial	markets),	not	citizens	or	civil	society	stakeholders.	The	interest	in	market	integrity	
similarly	is	to	allow	investors	to	be	able	to	trust	the	markets,	so	they	will	invest.	This	is	
evidenced	clearly	through	the	post-crisis	mainstream	and	industry	narratives	of	‘rebuilding	
trust’	in	the	financial	system.389		
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This	broadened	conduct	agenda	which	includes	the	protection	of	consumers	and	investors	in	
retail	and	wholesale	environments,	although	a	step	forward	from	pure	investor	protection,	
therefore	remains	entrenched390	in	a	more	market-dominated	welfare	economics	approach	to	
regulation.	The	protection	of	investors	and	consumers	is	seen	in	a	very	instrumental	way	as	
benefitting	the	market.	It	could	also	be	argued	that	it	is	therefore	predicated	upon	enabling	
wealth	extraction	for	those	with	finance	capital.	This	approach	therefore	fails	to	engage	with	the	
more	substantive	political	motives	of	regulation391	and	fails	to	justify	regulation	in	terms	of	
what	society	needs	from	regulated	financial	entities	and	how	they	should	behave.	Instead	it	is	
framed	and	justified	by	what	the	financial	markets	and	entities	need	to	do	in	order	to	continue	
society’s	contributions	to	them,	as	capital	providers	and	consumers.		The	emphasis	even	post-
crisis	therefore,	for	many	firms	and	regulators	has	been	on	justifying	regulation	as	a	means	for	
protecting	financial	entities’	financial	status	or	reputation.	Allied	efforts	have	therefore	been	
directed	at	enhancing	communication	in	line	with	this,	such	as	the	use	of	mechanisms	
supporting	disclosure	and	transparency	to	rational	actors.	The	debate	is	framed	around	the	
discourse	of	offering	choices	to	rational	actors	who	then	take	responsibility	for	their	choices392	
(which	we	will	see	in	the	following	case	study	of	USS),	rather	than	on	the	underlying	factors	that	
make	the	system	and	its	institutions,	people	and	processes	trustworthy393	and	contributory	to	
societal	needs	and	outcomes.		
	
In	the	UK,	this	focus	on	consumer	protection	therefore	can	be	seen	time	and	time	again	as	being	
a	response	to	scandals	or	serious	failures	and	the	perceived	need	to	justify	trust	in	the	system.	
Given	the	visible	and	widespread	failures	to	regulate	the	behaviours	of	financial	intermediaries	
as	they	engaged	with	consumers	in	regulated	sub-sectors	such	as	insurance	and	pension	
schemes,	buyers	of	credit	products	including	loans	and	mortgages,	together	with	consumers	of	
advice	from	regulated	financial	intermediaries,	the	regulator	responded	by	tightening	its	
consumer	protection	agenda.	It	is	arguable	that	this	kind	of	regulatory	response	is	intrinsically	
drawn	from	the	more	fundamental	commitment	to	market	primacy,	because	the	aim	is	to	
restore	trust	in	markets,	so	as	to	enable	what	is	seen	as	its	efficient	functioning.	The	UK	
																																																						
390	Ireland,	P.,	(2010),	‘The	Financial	Crisis:	Regulatory	Failure	or	Systems	Failure’,	The	Future	of	Financial	Regulation,	Oregon	
391	Harnay,	S.,	(2016),	The	influence	of	the	economic	approaches	to	regulation	on	banking	regulations:	a	short	history	of	banking	
regulations,	Cambridge	Journal	of	Economics,	Vol	40,	Issue	2,	pp	401-426	
392	Olsen,	N.,	(2017),	From	Choice	to	Welfare:	The	Concept	of	the	Consumer	in	the	Chicago	School	of	Economics,	Modern	Intellectual	
History,	08/2017,	Volume	14,	Issue	2	pp	507-535	at	https://doi.org/10.1017/S1479244316000202	
[accessed	on	8th	April,	2019]	
	
393	O’Neill,	O.	(2018)	Linking	Trust	to	Trustworthiness,	International	Journal	of	Philosophical	Studies,	Volume	26,	Issue	2,	pp	293-300	
[online]	at	https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2018.1454637	[accessed	on	10th	November	2018]	
	 101	
regulator	has	clearly	conducted	reviews	of	cross-sectoral	issues,	market	studies	and	what	it	
calls	thematic	reviews.394	
	
Across	both	prudential	and	conduct	regulation,	regulators	also	exercise	their	powers	to	oversee	
the	regulatory	perimeter	(including	ensuring	fitness	and	propriety	and	the	meeting	of	threshold	
conditions),	governance,	culture,	enforcement	and	so	on,	as	these	have	a	significant	bearing	on	
the	execution	of	the	prudential	and	conduct	responsibilities.	Depending	on	regulatory	remit,	
they	may	also	have	objectives	and	powers	in	relation	to	the	promotion	of	competition,	
preservation	of	the	domestic	market,	prevention	of	financial	crime	and	so	on,	that	may	sit	
alongside	their	prudential	or	conduct	regulation	mandate.	These	regulatory	objectives	–	notably	
the	one	on	competition	–	further	entrench	the	marketised,	financialised	narrative	of	financial	
regulation		
	
How	can	post-GFC	learning	about	macro-prudential	regulation	be	applied	to	conduct	regulation	
	
The	comments	within	this	section	seek	to	engage	with	two	key	findings	from	the	analysis	of	the	
causes	of	the	global	financial	crisis	and	to	use	them	to	introduce	a	new	insight	to	the	
development	of	conduct	regulation.		
	
The	first	of	these	is	the	step-change	in	regulation	after	the	crisis	when	it	was	more	broadly	
acknowledged	that	a	solely	micro-prudential	approach	to	prudential	regulation,	was	based	on	
the	false	premise	that	the	resolvability	of	individual	firms	would	form	an	effective	mitigant	and	
forestall	system-wide	distress.	In	hindsight,	it	was	obvious	that	this	assumption	was	incorrect.	
Tarullo	(2013)	refers	to	this	change	as	shaking	up	the	‘intellectual	foundations’	of	regulation395	
leading	to	the	introduction	of	a	macro-prudential	approach	to	prudential	regulation	to	partner	
micro-prudential	regulation.		
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The	second	is	the	growing	recognition	of	the	role	of	financialization396	and	the	pre-eminence	of	
the	market	paradigm,	in	engendering	the	GFC.397	Because	financialization	increases	the	power	
of	finance	capital,	creates	greater	scope	for	regulatory	arbitrage,	understates	contagion	and	
results	in	a	lop-sided	system,	winnings	are	harvested	for	financiers,	and	civil	society	
stakeholders	pay	the	price.	For	example,	trading	in	commodities	derivatives	causes	serious	
hunger	and	deprivation	to	ordinary	people	in	developing	/	food-producing	countries.			
	
In	the	more	developed	market	economies	where	financial	interests	have	power,	regulation	is	
considered	a	burden	on	finance	capital	and	is	condoned	as	a	necessary	evil	that	must	be	
minimised.	Light-touch	regulation	that	engages	with	issues	in	a	minimally	invasive	manner	is	
the	norm.	These	approaches	were	extensively	used	and	form	a	significant	part	of	the	pre-crisis	
narrative398	around	regulation.	However,	the	post-crisis	narrative	amongst	regulators	and	
indeed	academics	studying	regulation,	while	it	acknowledges399	the	issues	of	the	neglect	of	
contagion,	widespread	misbehaviour400	and	opposition	to	regulation,	continue	to	frame	
regulation	using	pre-crisis	market-centric	economic	rationales.		
	
While	there	is	a	superficial	engagement	with	these	issues,	there	is	a	marked	lack	of	practical	
regulatory	will	in	the	UK	to	refocus	the	rationales	for	public-interested	regulation	towards	the	
substantive	political	rationales	for	regulation	rather	than	towards	the	economic	rationales	for	
regulation.	An	example	of	the	continuation	of	engagement	with	the	market	paradigm	lies	in	how	
the	FCA	now	engages	with	competition	as	part	of	its	regulatory	remit.	There	are		widespread	
examples	of	mis-selling	(PPI),401	mispricing	(interest	rate	hedging	products	and	investment	
management),	poor	complaints	handling	(retail	banking	and	SME	lending),	hidden	charges	and	
fees	(credit	cards),	collusion	manipulation	and	rate-fixing	(LIBOR),	facilitation	of	structures	and	
instruments	that	deliberately	undermine	govt	policy	and	taxation	arrangements	(Paradise	and	
Panama	chapters	revelations),	miscommunications	to	consumers	and	policy	holders	(pension	
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transfers)	and	the	deliberate	exacerbation	of	information	asymmetry	and	moral	hazard	
problems	through	the	creation	and	use	of	complex	structures	and	instruments.	Yet,	the	
regulatory	approach	in	the	UK	has	continued	to	deal	with	this	at	an	individual	firm-level	or	at	a	
thematic	level	on	an	ad-hoc	basis	at	best.	There	is	little	holistic	challenge	of	misconduct	within	
the	industry	at	a	more	macro-level.	This	challenge	seems	like	an	obvious	necessity	given	the	
widespread	evidence	of	regulated	firms	across	the	regulatory	landscape	participating	in	
financial	activities	in	a	manner	that	often	games	the	system,	re-engineers	rules,	captures	
regulators	and	lobbies	for	its	own	interest	in	a	manner	that	seriously	impinges	upon	the	
democratic	rights	of	other	civil	society	stakeholders.		
	
Therefore,	this	thesis	argues	that	many	of	the	myths	arising	from	a	financialised	approach	to	
markets	dominant	prior	to	the	crisis	remain	staunchly	in	place	even	post-crisis.	While	the	
narratives	of	systemic	risk	and	contagion	have	taken	root	within	the	prudential	discourse	
allowing	the	macro-prudential	approaches	to	have	a	role,	there	is	little	recognition	of	the	need	
to	address	these	issues	from	within	the	conduct	agenda.	These	myths	are	that:				
• the	conduct	of	specific	financial	intermediaries	and	the	disposition	of	financial	markets	as	a	
whole,	are	dichotomous	and	mutually	exclusive.	This	is	the	main	argument	that	matches	the	
broader	macro-prudential	argument.	
• the	background	conditions	against	which	stakeholders	and	the	real	economy	interact	with	
financial	intermediaries	or	financial	markets,	are	largely	fair,	and	any	instances	of	poor	
conduct	/	misbehaviour,	are	aberrations	from	the	norm	
• policy	makers	(and	citizens)	do	not	need	to	draft	regulation	that	consults	with	and	protects	
a	wider	range	of	stakeholders.	They	should	focus	their	attentions	on	owners	of	finance	
capital	(i.e.	investor	protection)402	and	overcoming	the	irresponsibility	or	information	
asymmetries	that	affect	a	small	number	of	weak	participants	who,	to	all	intents	and	
purposes,	should	not	be	participating	in	the	markets	anyway	(because	they	are	incapable	of	
understanding	sophisticated	markets)	and	who,	for	the	most	part,	should	only	interact	with	
the	markets	through	more	sophisticated	financial	intermediaries	who	will	protect	their	
interests	and	are	best	placed	to	price	risk	and	reward	in	the	markets.		
	
The	changes	to	conduct	regulation	suggested	by	this	chapter	therefore	mirror	some	of	the	
trajectory	in	the	changes	from	a	micro-prudential	approach	to	prudential	regulation	to	a	more	
nuanced	balance	of	micro-prudential	and	macro-prudential	regulation	post-crisis.	They	also	
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take	forward	the	critiques	implicit	in	requiring	the	removal	of	a	purely	economic	approach	to	
regulation	
	
Macro-conduct	regulation	
	
Currently	the	structure	of	financial	regulation	in	the	UK,	appears	somewhat	lopsided	when	the	
structures	of	prudential	and	conduct	regulation	(the	twin-peaks)	are	viewed	side	by	side.	As	
discussed	above,	prudential	regulation	is	sliced	into	micro-prudential	and	macro-prudential	
regulation,403	offering	the	possibility	for	regulatory	policy-making	and	intervention	at	the	level	
of	the	individual	firm	(micro-prudential)	and	at	a	more	systemic-level	(macro-prudential)	with	
associated	tools	and	techniques	and	complementarities.	Conduct	regulation404	on	the	other	
hand	is	conceived	as	market-conduct	regulation	and	consumer	protection	regulation.	While	
superficially	it	may	appear	that	market	conduct	regulation	would	look	at	markets	more	
holistically,	in	reality	market	conduct	regulation	is	designed	to	deal	with	the	oversight	of	
primary	and	secondary	markets	within	the	securities	industry.	Consumer	protection	regulation	
has	largely	evolved	according	to	the	challenges	of	retail	financial	services	consumers.	
	
From	a	theoretical	perspective,	there	is	a	clear	imbalance	when	drawing	parallels	between	
prudential	and	conduct	regulatory	interventions.	Given	that	many	of	the	insights	into	regulatory	
framework	improvements	post-crisis	are	largely	in	the	prudential	domain	and	have	been	
perceived	through	the	valid	lens	of	macro-	versus	micro-	issues,	it	would	be	valuable	to	make	
that	understanding	more	symmetric	on	the	conduct	side	through	extending	the	parallel	branch	
of	the	regulatory	tree	and	recalibrating	the	classification	of	conduct	regulation	so	as	to	take	
account	of	the	systemic	implications405	of	misconduct.			
	
It	is	also	worth	making	the	point	at	this	stage	that	the	narrative	of	both	market	conduct	and	
consumer	protection	regulation	post-crisis	was	aimed	at	restoring	trust	in	the	financial	system	
and	encouraging	/	retaining	consumption	of	financial	products	and	services	playing	to	a	
financialised	narrative	that	places	the	well-being	of	the	financial	sector	at	the	heart	of	
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regulatory	initiatives.	If	instead	we	take	a	slightly	different	perspective	and	examine	the	need	
for	trustworthiness	of	the	financial	sector,	not	just	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	sector’s	needs	
but	from	the	view	of	what	the	real	economy	needs,	then	there	is	significant	room	for	
improvement	in	the	ways	the	regulatory	architecture	is	currently	cast	in	the	conduct	space.		
	
One	question	that	might	be	asked	is:	isn’t	market	conduct	regulation	the	answer	that	addresses	
systemic	risks	on	the	conduct	side?	By	its	very	definition	does	this	not	have	market-wide	
aspects?	The	answer	is	that,	in	practice,	regulatory	actions	including	enforcement	for	market	
misconduct	are	taken	at	an	entity-level,	making	this	form	of	regulatory	activity	quite	micro-
focussed	in	real	terms.	Consumer	protection	regulation	similarly	does	not	have	a	simple	micro-
dimension	because	the	issues	of	misconduct	that	fall	into	the	consumer	protection	bucket	have	
serious	system-wide	implications	that	necessitate	a	more	system-wide	approach	to	their	
regulation.	Exploring	the	wider	social	and	economic	costs	of	misconduct,	Parajon-Skinner	
(2016)	points	out	the	differing	treatments	given	to	prudential	regulation	vis-a-vis	conduct	
regulation.	She	points	out	that	regulators	reacted	to	the	global	financial	crisis	by	engaging	more	
holistically	and	systematically	with	risk	types	that	are	traditionally	calculated	using	quantitative	
models.	Yet	the	systemic	dimensions	of	misconduct	were	not	acknowledged	in	the	same	way.	
Despite	evidence	of	industry-wide	misconduct,	the	systemic	aspects	of	the	risks	arising	from	
misconduct	were	neglected406		
	
The	only	exception	in	the	UK	regulatory	approach	on	conduct	regulation	is	in	the	tool	termed	as	
a	thematic	review.407		These	reviews	are	described	by	the	FCA	as	mechanisms	they	use	‘to	
assess	a	current	or	emerging	risk	regarding	an	issue	or	product	across	a	number	of	firms	in	a	
sector	or	market.	It	can	focus	on	finding	out	what	is	happening	and	suggesting	ways	of	tackling	
the	problem’.	Although	such	thematic	reviews	can	have	a	broader	sub-sector-wide	or	sector-
wide	focus,	they	still	do	not	compensate	for	the	lack	of	a	systematic	approach	to	misconduct,	
because	these	reviews	are	generally	done	on	an	ad-hoc	basis	on	issues	of	importance,	and	may	
have	no	regular	standing	or	repetitive	systematic	inclusion	in	the	regulatory	calendar.	Also,	by	
their	very	nature,	they	focus	on	themes	of	importance	driven	reactively	by	issues	of	the	day,	
rather	than	on	pre-emptive,	proactive	approaches	to	systemic	risk.		
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It	is	also	worth	noting	historian	Niklas	Olsen’s	observations	that	the	existing	approach	to	
regulation	is	based	in	Chicago	school	ideology,	and	undermines	and	negatively	reconstructs	
regulation	in	respect	of	the	substantive	political	rationales	for	regulation.	Olsen	notes	that	those	
who	support	this	ideological	position	‘shared	the	ambition	of	rethinking	how	the	functions	of	
the	state	could	be	redefined	to	secure	a	free	market	and	individual	freedom.	The	positive	notion	
of	the	state	—	and	other	political	institutions	—	as	the	guarantor	of	a	competitive	order	is	
crucial	to	the	way	in	which	these	neoliberals	sought	to	distinguish	their	project	from	the	
political	economy	of	so-called	classical	liberalism’.408	This	positive	notion	of	the	state	is	
integrally	bound	with	what	is	also	a	singularly	weak	bounded	approach	to	the	scope	of	what	
regulation	and	regulators	should	do	as	encapsulated	by	the	FSA’s	pre-crisis	penchant	for	‘light-
touch’	regulation	and	for	allowing	firms	to	envision	their	own	business	models409	without	
regulatory	challenge	of	anything	other	than	the	micro-prudential	consequences.	These	
approaches	were	severely	criticised	for	contributing	to	the	GFC.410		
	
Noting	the	lessons	from	the	GFC,	what	then	becomes	obvious	is	that	there	is	no	space	on	the	
conduct-regulation	classification	for	a	meaningful	engagement	with	issues	that	span	the	
financial	system	as	a	whole.	Endemic	misbehaviour	in	the	system,	that	is	often	bolstered	by	this	
lack	of	oversight,	for	example,	is	not	tackled,	and	for	certain	serial	offenders	amongst	the	
regulated	entities,	the	cost	of	the	regulators’	fines	and	penalties	for	misconduct	is	often	viewed	
by	the	firms	as	the	‘cost	of	doing	business’.	This	resonates	with	the	findings	from	the	prior	
chapter’s	analysis	of	causes	of	the	GFC.	
	
This	theoretical	gap	is	therefore	addressed	by	introducing	a	more	orderly	approach	of	
providing	systematic	and	holistic	regulation	of	misconduct	that	engages	with	systemic	
dimensions	of	conduct	risks	and	the	associated	possibilities	of	contagion.	This,	in	essence,	is	the	
primary	scholarly	contribution	of	this	chapter.	The	chapter	suggests	that	as	a	parallel	to	macro-
prudential	regulation,	we	must	take	a	more	holistic	view	of	conduct	and	recognise	that	
behavioural	issues	should	not	be	viewed	in	isolation	but	in	the	context	of	their	linkages	within	
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the	financial	system	and	beyond.	They	can	be	transmitted	across	the	system	to	create,	amplify	
or	transform	systemic	shocks	and	failures.		
	
Macro-conduct	regulation	is	aimed	at	evaluating,	overseeing	and	ensuring	the	effective	
management	or	mitigation	of	the	system-wide	sources,	transmission	and	consequences	of	
misconduct,	so	as	to	effectively	address	negative	consequences	for	societal	stakeholders	and	the	
real	economy.	It	must	be	noted	that	there	is	both	a	complementarity	and	a	tension	between	
micro-and	macro-	conduct	oversight.	This	is	similar	to	the	tension411	between	macro-prudential	
and	micro-prudential	supervisory	objectives.	There	is	likely	to	be	a	valid	and	meaningful	
tension	between	what	might	be	applicable	to	conduct	supervision	at	a	firm-level	vis-à-vis	the	
regulatory	oversight	and	tools	applied	at	a	sub-sectoral	or	sectoral	level.	This	is	because	the	
micro-conduct	regulation	is	aimed	at	addressing	idiosyncratic	instances	of	misconduct	that	are	
specifically	at	a	regulated	entity-level	while	the	latter	is	more	attuned	to	the	real	economic	
impact	of	the	creation	and	transmission	of	systemic	failings.		
	
Using	a	welfare-economics	narrative,	the	role	of	macro-conduct	regulation	could	partially	(and	
this	is	an	important	qualifier	because	there	are	multiple	other	roles)	be	described	as	ensuring	
that	the	regulated	financial	industry	internalises	the	systemic	impact	of	its	misconduct.	To	do	
this,	macro-conduct	regulation	must	be	able	to	grapple	substantively	with	the	externalities	that	
the	regulated	financial	system	imposes	upon	the	economy.	In	this	role,	it	can	also	provide	useful	
proactive	data	and	signals	that	help	to	shape	not	just	macro-	and	micro-prudential	and	micro-
conduct	regulation,	but	also	fiscal	policy,	monetary	policy	and	the	regulatory	perimeter.	How	
and	why	this	could	and	should	be	done	is	discussed	further	below.		
	
As	discussed	when	explaining	the	causes	of	the	global	financial	crisis,	much	of	the	energy	and	
reform	that	was	undertaken	post-crisis	has	been	blunted	by	financialization.	Macro-conduct	
regulation	could	help	to	sharpen	the	application	of	regulation	by	returning	to	first	principles	
about	the	nature	and	purpose	of	finance.	We	are	well	aware	that	too	little	finance	acts	as	a	
barrier	to	economic	development.	But	as	Shaxson	(2018)	points	out,	many	economies	are	now	
suffering	from	a	different	blight,	known	as	the	finance	curse,	meaning	too	much	finance	of	the	
wrong	sort.412	This	offers	an	important	prompt	to	re-examine	from	first	principles	what	society	
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needs	and	wants	from	finance,	and	what	scale	finance	can	legitimately	have	in	a	well-
functioning	economy.	One	natural	reaction	to	such	a	proposition	would	be	to	recognise	that	re-
examining	the	fundamental	purpose	and	remit	of	finance	and	financiers	in	a	democracy	would	
require	democratic	deliberation.	In	such	a	democratic	discussion,	power	arrangements	would	
need	to	be	reconfigured	to	genuinely	put	citizens’	views	front-and-centre.		
	
However,	such	democratic	deliberation	can	be	undermined	if	elected	parliamentarians	have	to	
perform	this	examination	without	a	meaningful	understanding	of	the	scale,	complexity,	scope	
and	mechanics	of	financial	markets	and	instruments,	as	well	as	their	application	in	the	
economy,	which	may	differ	from	their	theoretically	envisaged	purpose.	This	makes	it	important	
for	regulators	to	participate	in	a	meaningful	way	to	inform	such	deliberation	by	providing	both	
data	and	insights	and	to	help	ensure	that	legislation	has	depth	and	can	hold	the	regulated	
community	to	account	where	needed.	
	
One	of	the	key	areas	for	macro-prudential	and	macro-conduct	regulators	to	be	able	to	provide	
intelligence	could	be	in	the	area	of	credit-extension	and	debt.	Montgomerie	(2018),413	explains	
‘while	policymakers	have	focused	their	efforts	on	trying	to	reduce	the	level	of	public	debt,	rising	
levels	of	household	debt	have	been	ignored’.	In	doing	so	it	is	helpful	to	understand	which	types	
of	financial	instruments	and	causes	are	fuelling	the	build-up	of	debt	and	what	segments	of	the	
economy	the	credit	and	debt	bubbles	are	operating	in.	This	is	not	just	a	case	of	understanding	
the	numbers	at	a	holistic	level	(something	governments	could	solely	rely	on	central	banks	and	
macro-prudential	regulators	for),	but	also	to	understand	the	behavioural	aspects	of	the	credit	
extension	(macro-conduct),	both	across	financial	intermediaries	extending	credit	and	across	the	
indebted	individuals	or	commercial	entities	taking	on	the	debt.	Contributions	from	macro-
conduct	regulators	could	be	envisaged	to	help	answer	questions	such	as:		
• which	types	of	regulated	financial	entities	are	extending	credit	in	the	economy,	what	
proportion	of	unregulated	entities	are	extending	credit	or	credit-like	solutions	(ie	the	
pre-crisis	problem	of	shadow-banking)	
• what	business	models	are	being	used,	what	forms	is	the	credit-extension	taking,	in	
terms	of	instruments	or	innovations	being	developed,		
• what	is	the	narrative	accompanying	the	sale	and	what	are	the	techniques	that	are	being	
used	to	sell	the	credit,		
• who	is	“buying”	the	credit	and	why,		
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• what	is	such	credit	being	applied	to	-	is	there	a	productive	or	speculative	purpose	
• to	whom	are	the	gains	being	apportioned	
• are	there	any	instruments	that	are	resulting	in	leakage	or	improper	use,		
• are	the	rates	at	which	credit	is	being	extended	consistent	with	monetary	policy	aims	and	
so	on.			
	
Many	regulators	shy	away	from	appearing	to	drive	or	be	driven	by	governmental	policy	because	
regulatory	independence	is	seen	as	a	key	way	to	emphasise	regulatory	legitimacy.	Majone	
(2007)	notes	that	‘These	non-elected	bodies’	legitimization	is	normally	based	on	a	large	array	of	
‘non-democratic’	justifications,	but	primarily	the	need	for	insulation	from	day-to-day	politics	
and	technical	expertise’.414	Meaningful	macro-conduct	regulation	would	therefore	not	just	
require	a	more	nuanced	application	of	the	regulatory	toolkit	but	the	development	of	strengths	
and	resources	in	areas	that	have	hitherto	been	considered	best	left	outside	the	regulatory	
ambit.415	
	
In	this	regard,	key	areas	of	change	include	allowing	such	macro-conduct	regulation	to	engage	
more	clearly	with	the	substantive	political	rationales	for	regulation	that	are	currently	
articulated	through	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	(ie	through	progressive	taxation	and	the	use	of	
inflation	and	unemployment	targeting).	A	combined	fiscal,	monetary	and	macro-micro	approach	
to	regulation	would	allow	the	state	to	have	control	over	the	real	economy	by	exerting	control	
over	its	enablers	in	finance.		
	
Invoking	the	power	of	such	a	regulatory	understanding	of	purpose,	instrument,	market	and	
entity	would	however	help	provide	a	more	nuanced	application	of	monetary	and	fiscal	policies,	
as	well	as	engaging	with	the	challenges	posed	by	financialization.	It	would	help	to	have	more	
holistic	responses	across	different	policy	spheres	and	using	different	instruments,	one	segment	
of	which	would	be	carried	out	through	regulatory	policy,	supervision	and	enforcement	at	
macro-	and	micro-	levels,	while	others	may	require	complementary	actions	using	monetary	and	
fiscal	policy	instruments.	Some	issues	may	be	remedied	by	including	certain	types	of	entities	
within	the	regulatory	perimeter	to	ensure	appropriate	regulatory	oversight	of	the	provision	of	
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such	credit	instruments,	whatever	forms	they	may	take,	to	help	cope	better	with	financial	and	
legal	engineering.	An	example	of	this	is	including	hedge	funds	and	providers	of	private	equity	
within	the	purview	of	the	regulation.	Others	may	require	the	education	of	or	communications	
with	consumers	or	those	designing	and	selling	certain	types	of	financial	instruments	to	help	
reconcile	the	notions	of	agency	and	personal	choice	with	the	structural	issues	that	prevent	
informed	choice.	An	example	of	this	is	yet	others	may	require	reconfiguration	of	the	markets	or	
addressing	behavioural	lapses	through	enforcement,	taxation,	withdrawal	of	money	in	
circulation	or	closing	loopholes.				
	
Together,	this	recalibration	helps	to	deal	with	both	the	contagion	in	conduct	issues	within	the	
financial	system	and	the	need	to	think	more	holistically	about	the	application	of	systemic	levers	
and	the	interconnections	between	monetary	policy,	fiscal	policy,	moral	suasion	and	financial	
regulation.		
	
	
Conclusion	
After	the	global	financial	crisis,	the	structure	of	prudential	regulation	was	radically	reformed.	
The	new	structure	was	built	on	the	recognition	that	there	are	systemic	aspects	to	risk,	that	
cannot	be	dealt	with	through	micro-level	adjustments	to	the	supervision	of	individual	firms.	It	
was	acknowledged	that	existing	structures	of	micro-prudential	regulation	coupled	with	high-
level	financial	stability	work	and	ad-hoc	thematic	interventions	were	insufficient	to	deal	with	
the	systemic	risk	issues	in	an	orderly	and	thorough	systematic	way.	Macro-prudential	
regulation	seeks	to	address	this	gap	in	oversight	by	taking	into	account	the	effects	of	the	
interactions	across	different	firms	and	systemic	impacts	thereof.		This	chapter	makes	a	
contribution	to	the	scholarly	literature	on	regulation	by	applying	existing	developments	in	
regulatory	theory	from	the	parallel	field	of	prudential	regulation,	to	the	study	and	practice	of	
conduct	regulation.	In	doing	so,	it	makes	a	critical	contribution	by	highlighting	the	narrow	way	
in	which	conduct	regulation	is	currently	conceived.	It	also	moves	the	narrative	away	from	being	
focussed	on	consumers	and	shareholders	(both	defined	by	their	access	to	finance	capital),	to	a	
more	holistic	interpretation	of	civil	society	and	citizen	needs	from	financial	regulation.	In	doing	
so,	it	develops	the	substantive	political	approaches	within	the	public	interest	theories	of	
regulation.	Directions	for	further	research	are	developed	within	the	concluding	chapter	of	this	
thesis	as	a	whole.		
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Chapter	3:	USS	Case	Study	
	
This	chapter	is	a	case	study	of	the	Universities	Superannuation	Scheme	(USS)	as	set	out	against	
the	backdrop	of	the	industrial	disputes,	and	the	financialization	of	Higher	Education	(HE).	The	
case	examines	questions	of	inequality,	justice,	power,	narrative	distortion	and	harm	production,	
that	foreground	an	investigation	into	risk-sharing	at	USS.	Drawing	on	two	issues	–	one	of	
prolonged	employer	underpayments	into	the	USS	Scheme	and	the	second	of	supposedly	
prudent	de-risking,	the	case	illustrates	how	financialisation	provides	the	underpinning	logic	for	
the	erosion	of	civil	society	interests.	Such	interests	include	the	interests	of	ordinary	citizens	
within	the	UK	and	global	communities	within	which	USS	operates.	Using	the	two	instances	it	
particularly	explores	how	financialisation	can	cause,	and	facilitate	manipulations	of	the	
narrative	around	risk	so	as	to	legitimise	the	prioritisation	of	the	interests	of	powerful	actors.	In	
doing	this,	the	case	observes	how	risk	as	an	overarching	term	is	conceived,	and	how	this	
conception	can	include	or	exclude	risks	to	civil	society.	It	also	explores	how	the	gains	or	losses	
from	risk-taking	are	apportioned	and	how	the	protections	afforded	to	citizens	by	financial	
regulation	are	undermined.	At	its	core,	the	case	seeks	to	shine	a	powerful	light	on,	in	a	
financialised	context,	how	risks	are	conceptualised,	and	how	this	leads	to	risks	being	distributed	
or	re-distributed	between	elite	actors	and	civil	society,	to	the	detriment	of	civil	society	and	in	
particular,	ordinary	citizens.	Given	that	pensions	valuations	are	fraught	with	complexity,	the	
case	highlights	how	information	asymmetry	is	exacerbated	by	financialised	narratives	around	
risk,	that	in	turn	undermine	debate	and	citizen	protections	including	those	afforded	by	public-
interest	financial	regulation.		
	
Context	
In	2018,	circa	42,000	employees	in	the	Higher	Education	(HE)	sector	undertook	a	14-day	period	
of	sustained	strike	action.416	This	was	followed	up	by	8	days	of	strike	action	in	2019,417	and	a	
further	14	days	of	strike	action	in	2020.418	This	unprecedented	action	caused	significant	and	
visible	disruptions	to	the	HE	sector.	The	strike	arose	because	employers,	having	negotiated	
reductions	in	pension	benefits	in	2016,	had	argued	in	2017	and	2018	for	the	closure	of	the	
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Defined	Benefit	(DB)	segment	of	the	Universities	Superannuation	Scheme	(USS).	Instead	of	
employers	continuing	to	bear	the	risk	of	providing	a	guaranteed	pension	sum	to	USS	members	
in	retirement,	it	was	suggested	that	current	and	future	employees	would	instead	bear	the	risks	
of	Scheme	performance	in	entirety,	because	the	Scheme	would	be	turned	into	a	Defined	
Contribution	(DC)	Scheme	for	future	accrual,	changing	the	fundamental	nature	of	the	Scheme.419		
	
The	strike	action	also	motivated	many	university	staff	to	use	their	multi-disciplinary	skills	to	
engage	in	the	discourse	about	the	Universities	Superannuation	Scheme	(USS)	pension.	This	
work	was	able	to	unpick	the	narrative	of	how	risk	is	shared	between	qualifying	employers	and	
members	of	the	Scheme	and	also	surfaced	a	wide	range	of	questions	including	about	risk,	about	
the	role	of	The	Pensions	Regulator,	about	university	finances	and	priorities,	and	about	the	
longer-term	sustainability	of	the	Scheme.	These	questions	went	beyond	the	typical	level	of	
scrutiny	and	enquiry	regarding	pensions	decisions,	which	are	typically	predicated	in	the	
language	of	finance,	and	turned	the	discussion	into	a	more	holistic	exploration	of	risk	and	
pensions.	The	chapter	will	now	examine	some	of	these	questions	more	closely.	
	
This	chapter’s	contributions	to	the	literature	lie	in	its	unique	investigation	of	the	case	of	the	USS	
pension	fund,	using	not	just	the	traditional	lens	of	finance	(and	associated	pensions	modelling),	
but	also	scholarship	from	multiple	disciplines.	The	case	draws	upon	insights	from	history,	
regulation,	accounting,	sociology,	political	science,	law,	finance	and	actuarial	science	that	recast	
some	of	the	questions	about	risk,	and	the	narrative	around	risk-sharing.	It	will	provide	a	new	
multi-disciplinary	vantage	point	for	scrutiny	of	the	issues	on	pensions	using	USS	as	its	basis.	
Critical	discussions	are	then	animated	around	the	public	interest	rationales	for	regulation	-	
building	upon	work	by	scholars	including	Young420	and	Feintuck,421	and	around	corporate	
governance	and	the	use	of	the	mechanisms	of	transparency	and	disclosure	by	Clarke.422	These	
discussions	also	build	on	literature	around	power,	narratives	and	inequality	informed	by	
scholarly	work	by	Herman	and	Chomsky,423	and	Lukes,424	the	practical	consequences	for	dissent	
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and	critical	investigation	as	discussed	in	a	key	work	on	the	policing	of	dissent	by	Sikka	et	al.425	It	
will	also	consider	the	works	of	scholars	such	as	Tombs426	and	Simpson427	that	shine	a	spotlight	
on	crucial	aspects	of	harm	production	rather	than	on	the	traditional	focus	of	risk	management	
technique,	for	instance	harm	attenuation.	The	case	study	also	builds	on	work	in	the	area	of	
financialization	by	scholars	including	Epstein,428	Sawyer,429	Palley,430	Crotty,431	and	Krippner,432	
that	also	animate	discussions	in	earlier	papers	within	this	thesis.	This	then	allows	us	to	see	a	
different	panorama	of	risks	present	in	changes	that	have	been	or	are	to	be	made	to	USS,	in	
addition	to	the	more	straightforward	financial	risks	that	are	typically	examined.			
	
As	this	chapter	is	a	case	study	there	is	no	separate	literature	review	section	and	the	discussions	
of	key	papers	are	woven	in	and	throughout	the	following	discussion.		
		
Methodology	
The	chapter	employs	a	case	study	approach.	Baxter	and	Jack	(2008)	point	out	that	‘Qualitative	
case	study	methodology	provides	tools	for	researchers	to	study	complex	phenomena	within	
their	contexts.	When	the	approach	is	applied	correctly,	it	becomes	a	valuable	method	…	to	
develop	theory,	evaluate	programs,	and	develop	interventions’.433	Ruzzeni	(2014)	argues	that	
‘case-based	reasoning	locates	the	ultimate	source	of	our	epistemic	and	moral	intuitions	in	the	
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concreteness	and	idiosyncrasy	of	particulars’434.	Fry	et	al	(1999)435	explain	the	role	of	case	
studies	in	allowing	readers	to	reflect	upon	the	complexity	and	context	of	a	particular	problem	or	
a	particular	example,	while	using	the	example	in	itself	to	illustrate	the	main	themes	of	key	
societal	questions.	In	the	context	of	this,	the	use	of	a	case	study	approach	offers	a	microcosmic	
exploration	of	specific	issues	within	USS,	that	play	to	the	broader	theme	of	this	thesis,	i.e.	the	
role	of	financialization	in	corrupting	discussions	of	risk	and	rebalancing	power	from	civil	
society	stakeholders	towards	elite	interests.	The	case	study	approach	also	lends	itself	to	
engaging	with	the	socio-economic	questions	around	finance,	which	form	the	motivation	for	this	
thesis.		
	
Reasons	for	case	study	approach	
A	case	study	approach	has	been	adopted	for	this	paper,	for	a	few	key	reasons.	USS,	as	one	of	the	
last	surviving	Defined	Benefit	(DB)	pensions	in	the	UK,	may	also	be	seen	as	something	of	an	
exemplar	of	a	category	of	valuable	societal	retirement	provision	that,	the	evidence	in	this	case	
suggests,	has	been	ruthlessly	eroded	as	a	consequence	of	financialization,	thus	causing	
detriment	to	civil	society	stakeholders.		
	
While	the	circumstances	for	the	decline	of	different	DB	pension	funds	may	vary,	the	case	of	USS	
helps	illustrate	the	broader	point	about	the	imbalance	of	power	between	those	trustees	
communicating	about	the	health	of	a	pension	Scheme	and	ordinary	members,	even	when	highly	
skilled	and	knowledgeable.	This	imbalance	of	power	can	mean	that	even	a	healthy,	cash-flow	
positive	pension	fund	such	as	USS,	can	be	misrepresented	as	being	in	financial	difficulties	to	fit	
in	with	a	narrative	that	suits	powerful	interests.	USS,	in	this	sense,	is	a	contemporary	exemplar	
of	manufactured	crises	in	finance,	that	lie	at	the	confluence	of	inadequate	corporate	governance,	
narrow	or	misconstrued	regulation,	and	neoliberal	ideology,	resulting	in	poor	outcomes	for	
citizens	and	consumers.	
	
The	issues	around	risk	cited	within	this	case	study	help	to	reaffirm	a	point	made	in	the	first	
chapter	within	this	thesis.	Financialization	increases	moral	hazard,	and	causes	financiers	to	take	
more	risk	because	of	a	lack	of	accountability	for	their	actions.	Such	behaviours	cause	artificial	
distortions	in	asset	prices.	This	inhibits	the	interaction	of	aggregate	demand	and	supply	
functions	and	affects	how	price	is	determined	within	the	market	mechanism.	The	USS	case	
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study	also	provides	continuity	within	the	thesis	by	offering	a	contemporaneous	example	to	
illustrate	another	key	point	made	in	the	first	chapter	on	the	global	financial	crisis	of	2007.	
Similar	to	circumstances	in	that	crisis,	where	there	was	seemingly	no	obvious	single	cause,	
there	is	a	temptation	to	put	the	root	cause	of	any	serious	issues	down	to	happenstance	or	
vagaries	of	the	market.	But	further	analysis	about	USS	through	the	case	study	shows	that	there	
is	a	concerted	effort	to	provide	what	McCluskey	(2012)	refers	to	as	a	veneer	to	cover	up	
injustice436	and	the	intentional	expropriation	of	wealth	by	elites.	Indeed,	both	unjust	intent	and	
preventable	unjust	impact	are	manifest	in	both	the	2007	financial	crisis	and	in	the	case	of	the	
erosion	of	the	USS	pension.	Using	the	case	study	approach	to	draw	this	out	permits	a	more	
nuanced	exploration	of	the	underlying	issues	marrying	both	theoretical	precepts	and	real-world	
practice	in	a	meaningful	way.	This	helps	to	inform	aspects	of	policy	development	that	lie	both	at	
the	core	and	on	the	periphery	of	the	points	made	in	this	thesis	within	the	first	chapter	on	the	
financial	crisis	and	the	second	chapter	on	macro-conduct	regulation.		
	
Limitations	of	the	case	study	approach	
While	there	are	merits	in	the	case	study	approach	adopted	in	this	chapter,	it	is	clear	that	a	case	
of	this	nature,	dealing	with	a	single	entity,	can,	given	its	focus,	only	serve	as	a	descriptive,	
illustrative	and	analytical	aid	to	highlight	certain	key	areas,	rather	than	consistently	providing	
generalisable	findings.437		Since	this	case	study	attempts	to	capture	the	complexity	of	the	USS	
case,	the	learning	derived	would	need	appropriate	modification	for	use	in	the	case	of	other	
firms,	given	the	specificity	of	attention	on	USS438.	This	case	study	does	not	seek	to	propose	
enhancements	of	the	theory	on	pensions,	but	it	can	help	to	inform	theoretical	positions	based	
on	the	evidence	it	provides.		
	
How	the	case	is	developed	
The	case	examines	two	key	sets	of	decisions	about	risk-sharing.	First	the	case	examines	
underpayments.	Then	it	evaluates	the	use	of	de-risking.	Through	both	of	these,	the	transfer	of	
risk	from	employers	to	employees	and	the	corresponding	impact	on	the	Scheme	are	discussed	
drawing	links	to	financialisation.	The	case	then	briefly	explores	how	the	aims	and	objectives	of	
The	Pensions	Regulator	(TPR)	have	been	interpreted	in	the	context	of	Defined	Benefit	pension	
provision	and	more	specifically	in	the	debate	around	USS.	The	points	made	within	the	case	
connect	around	an	exploration	of	the	role	of	financialization	in	affecting	the	ways	in	which	risk	
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is	apportioned.	Financialisation,	the	case	suggests,	facilitates	the	transfer	of	risks	from	financial	
elites	to	citizens,	and	the	transfer	of	rewards	from	citizens	to	financial	elites.		
	
Documenting	the	particular	circumstances	of	USS,	this	chapter	aims	not	just	to	engage	with	the	
specificities	of	USS,	but	also	to	use	USS	as	an	illustrative	example	to	highlight	various	aspects	of	
the	thesis’	underlying	theme	of	financialization.	The	practical	elaboration	of	the	issue	of	
financialization	is	set	around	Epstein’s	(2005)	definition	of	financialization	as	‘the	increasing	
role	of	financial	motives,	financial	markets,	financial	actors	and	financial	institutions	in	the	
operation	of	the	domestic	and	international	economies’439.	In	particular,	there	is	a	focus	on	the	
persistent	enrichment	of	financiers,	those	who	have	control	of	capital	and	those	who	can	benefit	
from	institutional	largesse,	while	the	benefits	and	services	to	other	stakeholders	is	steadily	
worn	away.			
	
This	case	study	documents	how	some	key	corporate	governance	decisions	appear	inconsistent	
with	the	statutory	duty	of	protecting	members’	(beneficiaries,	current	members	and	future	
members)	interests.	In	doing	so	it	draws	attention	to	prolonged	employer	underpayments,	the	
implementation	of	‘reckless	de-risking’,	it	briefly	summarises	issues	with	the	use	of	a	flawed	
valuation	test	known	as	Test	1,	and	decisions	to	change	the	articles	of	association	of	USS	
Limited	in	ways	that	reduce	the	powers	of	stakeholders.			
	
The	case	study	first	charts	the	role	of	employer	underpayments	as	a	key	contributor	to	the	
diminution	of	the	fund.	Using	primary	data,	the	paper	reviews	the	context	of	such	
underpayments	across	three	triennial	valuation	cycles	between	1999	and	2008,	as	well	as	more	
recent	attempts	by	USSL	to	explain	these	underpayments.	The	case	study	juxtaposes	
underpayments	against	the	higher	rates	of	contribution	determined	by	the	Scheme	actuary	as	
appropriate	to	meet	future	liabilities.	It	also	notices	the	financial	and	economic	context	in	which	
USS	was	operating	at	the	time	and	the	longer-term	risks	that	the	Scheme	could	have	been	
exposed	to.	It	then	relates	the	reasons	for	and	approval	of,	these	underpayments	to	the	
underlying	theme	of	financialization.		
	
Then	the	case	study	looks	at	the	process	surrounding	the	valuation	and	in	particular,	more	
recent	attempts	to	supposedly	‘de-risk’	the	investment	portfolio,	in	line	with	employers’	risk	
appetite.	The	case	study	explores	evidence	of	the	way	in	which	USSL	proposes	to	undertake	this	
‘de-risking’	and	offers	an	important	insight	into	how	financialization	can	erode	the	provision	of	
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real	goods	and	services.	The	case	attempts	to	show	how	this	decision	to	‘de-risk’	privileges	
employers	over	members,	and	how	a	financialized	narrative	is	used	to	mask	wider	stakeholder	
detriment.	To	do	this,	the	case	also	looks	at	the	objectives	of	The	Pensions	Regulator	(TPR)	and	
key	associated	documents,	to	examine	how	TPR’s	focus	on	‘de-risking’	through	a	movement	into	
gilt-like	instruments,	has	been	misused	to	undermine	viable	DB	(Defined	Benefit)	Schemes	such	
as	USS.		
	
The	case	also	elaborates	on	how	the	prioritisation	of	employer	interests,	regulator’s	
philosophical	predisposition	to	closing	DB	pensions,	and	the	regulatory	focus	on	the	Pension	
Protection	Fund	(PPF)	tie	in	to	the	broader	theme	of	financialization,	typically	to	the	detriment	
of	the	longer-term	real	economic	value	generated	by	Defined	Benefit	pensions.		In	doing	this,	
the	case	study	juxtaposes	a	number	of	key	things:	risk-sharing	within	USS,	the	efforts	to	raise	
the	trajectory	of	member	contributions,	the	role	of	the	TPR,	and	TPR’s	preferred	approaches	to	
conceiving,	measuring	and	addressing	risk.	The	focus	is	on	the	narrative,	on	how	the	gains	from	
finance	and	risks	are	apportioned,	and	on	how	the	protections	afforded	to	citizens	by	financial	
regulation	can	be	undermined	by	financialization.		The	paper	also	sets	out	how	these	concerns	
are	consistent	with	Palley’s	(2007)	observations	that	‘financial	markets,	financial	institutions	
and	financial	elites	gain	greater	influence….	impacts	are	to	(1)	elevate	the	significance	of	the	
financial	sector	relative	to	the	real	sector;	(2)	transfer	income	from	the	real	sector	to	the	
financial	sector;	and	(3)	increase	income	inequality	and	contribute	to	wage	stagnation’.	440		
	
Overview	of	the	Scheme	and	its	current	financial	position	
History	of	the	Scheme	
Sir	Douglas	Logan’s	(1985)	published	account441	of	the	birth	of	USS,	explains	how	USS	was	set	
up	in	1975	in	response	to	concerns	such	as	the	lack	of	certainty	of	retirement	benefits,	
complexity	for	individuals	planning	independently	for	how	to	invest	contributions	from	
employers	and	employees,	that	would	pay	out	in	retirement	[i.e.	the	risks	of	a	DC-style	scheme],	
and	inequity	in	risk-sharing	especially	for	low-paid	employees.	These	core	concerns	for	
members	have	resurfaced	and	serve	as	lodestars	for	any	discussions	of	benefit	reform	almost	
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half	a	century	later.442		A	dispute	over	the	attendant	risks	arising	from	these	factors	and	how	
this	risk	should	be	shared	between	employers	and	employees	set	against	pay	and	conditions	
and	management’s	priorities,	has	culminated	in	a	pitched	battle	over	the	future	of	the	Scheme.		
	
The	nature	of	USS	and	implications	for	the	risk	profile	of	the	Scheme	
USS	is	a	funded,	multi-employer,	last-man	standing,	open,	immature	scheme.		This	affects	the	
risk-profile	of	the	Scheme	in	the	following	ways:	
USS	is	a	funded	scheme.	The	Scheme	acquires	‘dedicated	assets	to	cover	the	Scheme’s	
liabilities’.443	That	means	the	employer	systematically	sets	aside	payments	to	cover	the	
liabilities.	These	reflect	‘arrangements	where	there	is	an	accumulation	of	assets,	mainly	
financial	assets,	from	contributions,	with	the	explicit	objective	of	ensuring	all,	or	a	major	part	of,	
payment	of	the	future	benefits	from	these	assets’.444	This	funded	status	is	important	because	the	
progression	towards	paying	off	liabilities	is	gradual	and	planned,	and	therefore	allows	the	
Scheme	to	weather	adverse	outcomes	better.445	The	funded	status	of	the	Scheme	is	also	
important	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	employers’	desire	to	move	to	DC	and	the	apportionment	
of	risks	from	allocations	of	Deficit	Recovery	Contributions.	Both	these	points	will	be	discussed	
further	in	this	paper.		For	purposes	of	regulatory	safeguards,	the	Scheme	is	however	not	
deemed	entirely	risk-free,	as	it	is	not	fully	underwritten	by	a	sovereign.	That	said,	the	Scheme	
does	not	have	the	kind	of	exposure	of	a	sudden	agglomeration	of	risk	as	one	might	see	in	a	
Scheme	backed	by	a	single	employer	on	a	‘pay	as	you	go’	basis.	446		A	funded	Scheme	is	reliant	on	
the	Trustee	for	the	effective	management	of	its	assets	and	the	associated	income	streams,	in	
order	to	meet	its	liabilities	in	the	long-term.	The	Trustee’s	decisions	can	have	a	material	
influence	on	the	practicalities	of	risk-sharing	between	employers	and	members.	The	Scheme	is	
thus	exposed	to	risks	arising	from	how	the	trustee	conceptualises	risk	and	corresponding	
decision-making	in	relation	to	investment	management.		It	is	also	key	that	both	employers	and	
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members	monitor	the	conduct	of	the	Trustee	to	ensure	the	funds	collected	are	being	deployed	
in	a	judicious	way	that	is	consistent	with	the	collective	nature	of	the	Scheme.	This	is	an	
important	area	of	attention	for	this	paper.		
	
USS	is	a	multi-employer	scheme.	The	Scheme	pools	together	the	pensions	contributions	and	
risks	of	a	range	of	HE	institutions	and	allied	employers.	A	multi-employer	status	facilitates	the	
portability	of	pensions	–	a	key	factor	in	allowing	for	mobility	and	transfer	of	specialist	skills	in	
our	sector,	benefitting	the	real	economy.	The	multi-employer	status	impacts	certain	key	risks	in	
the	Scheme,	that	are	reduced	further	through	increased	pooling	across	different	member	
institutions,	thus	allowing	for	the	funding	costs	of	the	Scheme	to	be	lowered.	This	reduction	in	
funding	costs	can	be	of	significant	benefit	to	both	employers	and	members.	Even	the	largest	
institutions	in	numbers	constitute	less	than	5%	of	the	membership.	This	means	that	all	
institutions	–	both	big	and	small	–	benefit	from	pooling	of	risks,	with	the	smallest	institutions	
particularly	benefitting.	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	USS	is	an	industry-wide	Scheme	and	the	
funding	as	well	as	the	risks	must	be	viewed	differently	from	a	single-employer	Scheme	or	one	
with	a	small	group	of	employers.	This	is	particularly	important	when	examining	factors	such	as	
the	strength	of	the	employer	covenant	and	how	The	Pensions	Regulator	should	engage	with	the	
Scheme.			
	
USS	is	an	exclusive	scheme	and	there	are	significant	costs	for	discontinuing	participation	in	the	
Scheme.	USS	is	the	only	pension	Scheme	that	member	institutions	can	offer	to	their	qualifying	
employees	(with	some	exclusions	for	institutions’	legacy	pension	schemes),	with	severe	
penalties	for	breach	of	exclusivity.	Employers	wishing	to	leave	the	Scheme	are	penalised	if	they	
intentionally	breach	exclusivity	through	what	is	termed	as	a	Section	75	debt	or	buyout	that	
‘could	be	a	very	large	payment’.447	For	example,	Trinity	College,	Cambridge	(the	most	recent	
withdrawing	institution)	is	expected	to	be	charged	circa	£30	million448	for	leaving	the	Scheme,	
although	it	has	only	circa	100	members	in	the	Scheme.	There	are	very	few	HE	institutions	with	
the	financial	wherewithal	to	make	such	a	decision	on	a	considered	basis.	This	means	that	as	
long	as	the	rules	entrench	exclusivity,	the	Higher	Education	sector	in	the	UK	remains	active	at	
current	or	increasing	levels,	and	member	institutions	do	not	go	rogue	by	using	Special	Purpose	
Vehicles	(as	suggested	by	certain	unprincipled	advisers)449	to	off-roll	employees	from	the	
																																																						
447	Universities	Superannuation	Scheme,	(circa	2016),	Employer	debt	page	on	USS	website,	[online],	at	
https://www.uss.co.uk/employers/application-procedures/employer-debt	[accessed	on	22nd	June	2019].	
448	Cambridge	UCU,	Open	letter	to	the	Council	and	Fellows	of	Trinity	College,	Cambridge	(updated	8	June),		
(online)	at	http://www.ucu.cam.ac.uk/open-letter-to-the-council-and-fellows-of-trinity-college-cambridge/	[accessed	on	22nd	June	
2019].	
449	Stones,	N.,	(2019),	Big	Problem,	Think	Small,	8	am	playbook	on	researchbyresearch.com	at	
https://www.researchresearch.com/news/article/?articleId=1379552	[accessed	on	17th	July	2019].	
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participating	employer’s	books,	the	Scheme	will	continue	to	have	a	healthy	pipeline	of	new	
entrants,	replenishing	the	multi-employer	pool	both	in	terms	of	intergenerational	changes	and	
with	regard	to	the	depth	of	the	pool.	In	a	sector	like	Higher	Education	with	a	sector-wide	
Scheme	like	USS,	where	a	range	of	employers	with	different	strengths	and	sizes	participate	in	
the	Scheme,	this	element	entrenches	an	emphasis	on	mutuality,	strengthens	what	is	termed	as	
the	‘employer	covenant,	and	binds	together	employers	in	a	fairly	unique	way.	Aside	from	the	
pure	financial	gain,	that	remains	the	standard	narrative	of	discussions	around	risks	and	
pensions,	what	this	reinforces	is	the	sense	of	collegiality,	collaboration	and	community	that	are	
central	to	the	nature	of	the	kind	of	self-reinforcing	collaborative	research	structures	that	are	
vital	to	the	survival	of	the	sector	itself	and	add	real	economic	value,	but	are	not	reflected	in	
financial	measurement	techniques.		
	
USS	is	a	last-man	standing	Scheme.	The	last-man	standing	arrangement	in	the	Scheme	is	an	
interesting	and	relatively	rare	arrangement	nowadays.	It	protects	the	pensions	of	members	in	
case	of	an	employer	collapse,	by	transferring	the	defaulting	employer’s	liabilities	to	the	
remaining	employers	in	the	Scheme;	this	continues	in	a	chain	until	the	Scheme	has	to	close	due	
to	the	default	of	the	last	employer	in	the	Scheme.	Given	the	mutuality	of	research	and	the	
transferability	of	students	and	staff	in	the	sector	to	higher-strength	institutions,	having	a	last-
man-standing	Scheme,	offers	both	real	and	financial	value.	Members	benefit	from	knowing	their	
pensions	are	secure	even	if	their	sponsoring	institution	collapses.	Employers	also	benefit,	
because,	in	the	absence	of	what	is	colloquially	termed	‘a	doomsday	scenario’,	it	is	unlikely	that	
the	largest	institutions	will	end	up	carrying	all	the	liabilities.	While	the	risks	for	stronger	
institutions,	of	taking	on	other	weaker	institution’s	liabilities	may	seem	significant,	the	reality	is	
that	on	account	of	USS	being	a	funded	Scheme,	money	has	already	been	set	aside	for	a	
significant	proportion	of	any	departing	employer’s	liabilities.	Relatively	high	rates	of	deficit	
recovery	contributions	are	currently	set	aside	by	employers	to	avoid	such	eventualities.	Indeed,	
the	benefit	of	this	arrangement	isn’t	just	to	members.	Employers	also	benefit	from	the	pooling	
of	risks,	because	the	Scheme	has	reduced	running	costs.	USS	received	a	significant	reduction	in	
the	statutory	costs	levied	in	respect	of	the	Pension	Protection	Fund	(PPF)	because	potential	
access	to	the	PPF	does	not	arise	until	the	last	employer	becomes	insolvent.	This	therefore	not	
only	makes	the	Scheme	particularly	viable,	it	also	makes	the	charges	paid	to	the	PPF	lower,	
lowering	the	cost	burden	on	all	employers	and	members.	In	2017	employers	were	motivated450	
to	close	DB.451	Given	that	USS	is	a	last	man	standing	Scheme	and	therefore	relatively	strong,	
																																																						
450	Callard,	F.,	The	drive	to	convert	to	DC:	A	short	history,	USSBriefs	1	at	https://medium.com/ussbriefs/the-drive-to-convert-to-dc-
a-short-history-15079dc18182	[accessed	on	22nd	July	2019].	
451	Universities	UK,	(2014),	USS	funding	and	benefits	–	consultation	by	Universities	UK	at	https://tinyurl.com/yy9sxy4e	[accessed	
on	22nd	July	2019].	
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both	‘reckless’	de-risking	and	the	imposition	of	larger	deficit	recovery	contributions	(DRCs)	
allow	employers	to	justify	their	agenda	to	close	DB.	These	two	strategies	may	particularly	
benefit	employers	because	they	provide	a	higher	headline	rate	to	communicate	to	members,	
while	actually	paying	off	employers’	own	underpayments	ahead	of	Scheme	closure.	This	also	
helps	put	an	upper	bound	on	employer	contributions	to	the	DC	Scheme	in	the	future,	because	
DRCs	only	stay	as	long	as	the	DB	section	remains	open.	In	a	last-man-standing	funded	Scheme	
that	employers	may	wish	to	close,	de-risking	benefits	employers	because	they	use	current	
contributions	to	bear	costs	that	they	might	have	to	contribute	to	were	the	Scheme	to	close.	
There	are	also	arrangements	available	if	any	employer	no	longer	wishes	to	participate	in	the	
Scheme.	In	such	a	case,	the	departing	institution	is	permitted	to	buy-out	the	liabilities	it	
supports	in	the	Scheme.	The	departing	institution’s	debt	(also	known	as	a	Section	75	debt),	is	
assessed	not	just	in	relation	to	the	contributions	of	the	employer	but	also	in	relation	to	what	
coverage	of	liabilities	it	brings	to	the	covenant.		
	
USS	is	an	open	scheme,	which	means	that	for	employees	of	the	sponsoring	employers,	the	
scheme	is	open	to	all	eligible	employees.	This	is	different	from	other	schemes,	where	
participation	in	a	DB	scheme	may	be	closed	to	new	joiners.		Given	the	pyramidal	structure	of	
seniority	of	employment	in	HE,	the	new	contributions	streams	strengthen	the	cash	flow	of	the	
Scheme	increasing	its	viability.	Being	an	open	Scheme,	essentially	allows	USS	to	continually	
refresh	risks	through	the	introduction	of	new	Scheme	members’	contributions	and	typically	
long-term	pension	provision	horizon,	and	thus	reduces	the	risk	profile	of	the	Scheme	through	
pooling	of	risks	with	longer-standing	members	of	the	Scheme.	That	is,	new	entrants	to	the	
academic	profession	joining	USS	from	a	range	of	employers	allows	for	pooling	risks	across	
regions,	nations	and	generations.	Having	younger	members	replenish	the	Scheme	through	their	
greater	emphasis	on	contributions	rather	than	benefits,	restores	the	balance	of	the	Scheme,	and	
allows	the	Scheme	to	undertake	greater	(calculated)	risks	and	therefore	greater	returns,	than	
would	normally	be	present	for	a	Scheme	with	an	ageing	cohort.	This	helps	to	enhance	and	
ensure	benefit	stability	for	ageing	members	and	allows	the	Scheme	to	benefit	from	different	
asset	classes	for	investment	purposes.	It	also	facilitates	the	use	of	a	range	of	financial	
instruments	for	risk	management	rather	than	only	having	to	choose	elements	that	are	specific	
to	the	upcoming	benefits	of	say	an	ageing-cohort	of	members.	This	enhances	the	Trustee’s	
ability	to	prudently	use	an	appropriate	proportion	of	higher	risk	-	higher	return	investments	in	
the	Scheme,	and	permits	better	outcomes	for	all	members,	given	that	pension	scheme	
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investment	horizons	should	be	longer-term	in	nature.	From	a	risk	point	of	view,	close	attention	
must	also	be	paid	by	the	trustee	to	inter-generational	risk	transfers.		
	
USS	is	an	immature	scheme.	In	an	immature	scheme	the	bulk	of	liabilities	is	not	deemed	to	have	
already	accrued,	there	is	not	a	finite	time	horizon	to	scheme	closure	and	the	scheme	still	
remains	relevant	to	employers.	In	the	context	of	USS,	what	this	means	is	that	the	volume	of	new	
members	entering	is	in	excess	of	those	leaving	the	Scheme.452	This	immaturity	of	the	Scheme	
should	in	theory	pre-empt	the	need	for	greater	liquidity	and	much	lower	volatility	in	the	
portfolio	because	although	there	is	a	need	to	pay	benefits	for	the	members	who	are	retiring	or	
experiencing	morbidity	of	outcomes,	a	much	more	significant	proportion	of	members	continues	
to	pay	in	contributions.	This	strengthens	the	cash-flow	position	of	the	Scheme	reducing	the	
risks	of	Scheme	non-viability.	While	there	is	a	continued	excess	of	contributions	over	benefits	
and	the	expert	view	is	that	stability	of	cash	flows	is	expected	over	a	50-year	period,453	it	is	
argued	that	such	as	long-term	positive	cash-flow	implies	the	sustainability	of	the	Scheme	in	the	
long-term,	allowing	Trustees	to	override	short-term	considerations.	
	
The	nub	of	the	dispute	
As	of	2018,	USS	Limited	(USSL),	the	corporate	trustee	to	the	Scheme,	safeguards	£64bn	in	
Scheme	assets454	for	over	350	Higher	Education	(HE)	and	allied	employers,	and	the	Scheme	
covers	approximately	400,000	members.455		
	
USS’	accounts456	(2018)	reveal	that	the	Scheme	receives	£2.2bn	in	contributions	and	pays	out	
£2bn	in	benefits.	Not	only	is	the	Scheme	currently	cashflow	positive,	it	also	does	not,	at	this	
time,	draw	on	the	returns	on	its	investments,	let	alone	on	the	fund	itself	to	pay	out	benefits.	The	
Scheme	is	expected	to	remain	cashflow	positive	for	the	next	50	years.457		This	is	very	significant	
because	it	suggests	that	in	the	foreseeable	future,	there	is	only	a	relatively	small	risk	of	not	
being	able	to	pay	pensions.		
	
																																																						
452	USS	Joint	Expert	Panel,	(2018),	Report	of	the	Joint	Expert	Panel,	(online)	at	http://www.ussjep.org.uk/files/2018/09/report-of-
the-joint-expert-panel.pdf	[accessed	on	22nd	June	2019].	
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454	Universities	Superannuation	Scheme,	(2018),	Report	and	Accounts	for	the	year	ending	31st	March	2018,	[online],	at	
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Yet	as	of	2017,	USS	has	calculated	a	£7.4bn	‘past	service’	shortfall458	in	the	Scheme	meaning	that	
on	what	is	termed	a	‘technical	provisions’	basis,	the	Scheme’s	liabilities	exceed	the	Scheme’s	
assets,	providing	the	grounds	for	USSL	to	ask	employers	and	members	to	consider	contributions	
increases	and/or	reductions	in	Scheme	benefits.		
	
The	‘deficit’	is	calculated	by	USSL	using	what	is	called	a	triennial	valuation,	although	more	
frequent	valuations	may	be	undertaken	in	cases	where,	in	the	eyes	of	the	corporate	trustee,	
something	significant	has	changed	with	respect	to	the	Scheme’s	risk	profile.	The	valuation	
achieved	through	actuarial	modelling	is	then	used	to	inform	various	investment	decisions	as	
well	as	to	underpin	proposals	for	contributions	changes	or	changes	in	the	benefits	offered	to	
members.		
	
It	is	this	‘deficit’	calculated	by	USS	that	is	at	the	heart	of	current	and	previous	disagreements	
between	University	and	College	Union	(UCU),	as	the	representative	of	members	of	the	Scheme,	
and	Universities	UK	(UUK),	representing	employers.	
	
The	role	of	USSL		
The	Scheme’s	performance	is	dependent	on	employer	contributions,	employee	contributions	
and	investment	returns.	At	each	valuation,	the	required	contribution	rate	is	assessed	by	the	
Scheme	Actuary,	and	changes	to	this	rate	are	used	to	recalibrate	contributions	so	as	to	ensure	
that	scheme	liabilities	can	be	successfully	met	in	the	long-term.	The	Pensions	Regulator	
requires459	that	employers	adhere	to	such	contribution	rates,	and	it	is	the	duty	of	the	Trustee	to	
ensure	that	such	requirements	are	suitably	met,	or	to	take	action	where	this	is	not	the	case.	
USSL	has	a	key	role	to	play	in	calculating	the	Scheme’s	financial	health	through	its	extensive	
control	over	the	modelling	that	underpins	the	valuation	of	the	Scheme.460	Since	it	was	originally	
set	up,	the	Articles	of	Association461	have	entrusted	USSL	with	acting	in	the	best	interest	of	
members	(past,	present	and	future)	in	a	variety	of	ways.	This	includes,	but	is	not	limited	to,	
interpreting	pensions	law	and	pensions	regulation,	evaluating	and	interpreting	regulations	and	
legislation,	and	translating	these	into	how	risks	are	perceived	and	modelled.		
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USSL	also	has	an	important	role	to	play	in	driving	investment	decision-making	at	USS	
Investment	Management	(USSIM),	its	captive	investment	management	subsidiary.	USSL	also	
provides	the	documentation	and	preparatory	papers	for	discussions	on	the	Joint	Negotiating	
Committee	(JNC)	between	UUK	and	UCU.	USSL	also	runs	the	JNC	secretariat.	
	
USSL	as	a	lynchpin	
USSL	thus	plays	an	important	role	in	facilitating	key	decisions	that	result	in	the	realities	of	risk-
sharing.	It	is	not	just	at	the	heart	of	the	implementation	of	agreements	regarding	risk-sharing	
between	employers	and	employees,	but	also	in	making	nuanced	judgements	or	arguments	
regarding	implementing	the	investment	management	strategy.	It	therefore	also	has	a	key	role	in	
interpreting,	identifying	and	prioritising	risks;	devising	risk-mitigation	strategies;	and	in	
assessing	how	risks	are	distributed	inter-generationally	and	across	different	members	
categories.	Its	contributions	can	influence	the	narrative	of	the	discussions	between	employers	
and	members.	It	therefore	becomes	important	how	USSL	adds	to	the	narrative,	whom	USSL	may	
favour	or	not	favour,	how	USSL	discharges	its	responsibilities	towards	members	and	how	it	
interprets	and	manages	risk.		The	ideological	biases	at	USSL	therefore	have	a	significant	impact	
on	risk-sharing	within	the	scheme.	
	
Leech	(2018)	points	to	the	absence	of	what	he	terms	“economic	pluralism”	in	the	pensions	
discourse	more	generally.462	A	similar	concern	about	USS’	ideological	biases	are	raised	citing	the	
ideological	nature	of	these	views	of	USSL.	Leech	notes	that	‘on	the	one	hand	is	the	view	that	
investing	in	equities	has	a	high	probability	of	achieving	a	high	return	in	the	long	run,	through	
the	equity	premium.	This	is	the	‘patient	capital’	view,	for	which	there	is	(arguably)	considerable	
empirical	support,	often	attributed	to	Ben	Graham	and	followed	by	Warren	Buffett,	and	
traditionally	followed	by	pension	schemes.	On	the	other	hand,	is	the	view,	deriving	from	the	
newer	random	walk	model	of	modern	finance	theory,	that	risk	increases	in	the	long	run.	There	
is	no	long-run	equity	premium	and	all	investment	is	essentially	short	term	speculation.	This	
approach	underlies	the	current	accounting	rules	for	pension	assets	and	liabilities	on	company	
balance	sheets.’	
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Test	1	is	an	internal	test	within	the	valuation	and	is	used	by	USS	to	determine	how	close	the	
Scheme	is	to	being	self-sufficient	if	it	were	effectively	closed	within	20	years	time.	It	is	defined	
by	USS	as	‘a	test	designed	to	measure	whether	or	not	the	long	term	risk	in	the	DB	section	of	the	
scheme	is	within	the	risk	appetite	agreed	between	the	Trustee	and	the	sponsoring	employers.	
The	test	checks	that	the	difference	between	self-sufficiency	and	technical	provisions	in	20	years	
time	does	not	become	too	large	for	the	employers	to	support’463.	First	Actuarial,	independent	
actuarial	consultants,	expressed	frustration	when	they	noted	that	the	USS	investment	strategy	is	
being	determined	by	a	monitoring	metric	in	the	valuation,	which	in	itself	is	flawed.	This	creates	
a	recursive	loop,	in	that	a	deterioration	in	the	monitoring	metric	would	drive	the	further	
erosion	in	the	Scheme	as	a	result	of	Test	1,	meaning	that	monitoring	metrics	create	a	self-
fulfilling	prophesy.	Given	that	pensions	benefit	from,	and	should	reflect,	long-term	perspectives,	
using	a	short-term	metric	to	erode	longer-term	value	is	perverse	and	causes	danger.	
	
Employer	underpayments	
This	section	highlights	instances	of	the	Trustee	calibrating	contributions	in	a	manner	that	
misallocated	risks.		
Three	cycles	of	underpayments	
In	this	section	of	the	chapter,	decisions	to	maintain	a	lower	level	of	contributions	than	deemed	
actuarially	required	(also	referred	to	in	this	section	as	employer	underpayments),	after	the	
1999,	2002	and	2005	valuations,	are	discussed.	Risk-sharing	is	then	analysed	in	the	light	of	
decisions	that	reduced	the	size	of	employers’	contributions,	using	as	their	basis	a	purported	
surplus	in	the	Scheme.		
	
The	1999	decision	not	to	increase	employer	contributions		
In	its	1999464	valuation,	in	consultation	with	the	Scheme	Actuary,	USS	moved	from	a	‘projected	
unit’	method	to	a	‘market	value’	approach.	Under	the	new	methodology,	the	value	of	the	
scheme’s	current	assets	was	marked	to	market	as	of	the	valuation	date.	Since	at	the	time	over	
80%	of	the	scheme’s	assets	were	held	in	equities,	whose	market	prices	are	characteristically	
volatile,	this	type	of	change	had	a	substantial	effect	on	the	value	placed	on	the	balance	sheet.		
	
In	1999,	the	market	was	nearing	the	peak	of	the	‘dotcom’	bubble465.	Returns	were	inordinately	
high.	‘From	1974	to	2000	the	average	real	return	on	UK	equities	was	13%,	compared	with	a	
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[accessed	on	22nd	July	2019].	
465	The	dotcom	bubble	was	driven	by	rising	equity	market	expectations	of	the	returns	to	be	generated	from	the	growth	in	the	
internet	and	other	technology	innovations	
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twentieth	century	average	of	about	5.5%’.	466	Markets	in	1999,	at	a	point	immediately	prior	to	
the	collapse	of	the	‘dotcom’	bubble	in	early	2000,	were	demonstrating	something	similar	to	
investors’	irrational	exuberance	during	bubbles.	Equity	markets	were	noticeably	overinflated	
and	investment	returns	were	abnormally	high.	Laux	and	Leuz	(2010)467	point	out	that	‘Market	
prices	can	deviate	from	their	fundamental	values	for	various	reasons,	be	it	a	liquidity	crunch	or	
limits	to	arbitrage’.	As	a	result,	a	change	in	accounting	methodology	resulted	in	a	market-value-
based	valuation	that	showed	a	surplus	of	£1.4bn	whilst	the	actuaries	noted	that	if	‘exactly	the	
same	assumptions	adopted	for	the	1996	valuation’	had	been	used,	the	1999	valuation	would	
have	shown	a	deficit	of	£1.2bn.	468			
	
The	Scheme’s	valuation	was	submitted	in	March	2000,	when	this	market	position	was	evident	
to	market	participants	in	equity	markets.	The	market’s	position	was	also	evident	to	USS’	own	
management	as	was	reflected	in	p.14	of	USSL’s	1999	annual	report	and	accounts,	where	they	
cite	an	‘exceptionally	positive	investment	climate’.469		The	Scheme’s	transition	to	a	‘mark-to-
market’	approach	within	the	valuation,	at	this	time,	should	therefore	have	been	considered	with	
a	great	degree	of	caution,	especially	when	a	0.25%	decline	in	investment	return	could	lead	to	a	
deficit.	Expert	investment	managers,	the	Scheme	Actuary	and	USSL,	in	their	role	as	Corporate	
Trustee,	who	were	entrusted	with	the	protection	of	members’	interests,	should	therefore	have	
been	particularly	cautious	about	the	use	of	any	such	notional	surplus	as	grounds	for	proposing	
an	underpayment	by	the	employers.	As	the	valuation	date	was	March	2000	(which	
coincidentally	was	also	the	month	in	which	the	dotcom	bubble	burst),	such	caution	should	have	
been	expected,	rather	than	exceptional.	It	is	worth	noting	that	the	collapse	of	equity	markets	
after	the	dotcom	bubble	led	to	circa	$1	trillion	being	wiped	off	the	Nasdaq	in	the	space	of	one	
month	between	the	11th	of	March	and	April.470	
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In	2000,	the	USS	actuarial	valuation,	even	under	the	market	value	method,	recommended	an	
employer	contribution	rate	of	16.3%.471	However,	the	Trustee	after	discussion	with	the	
employers,	agreed	to	allow	them	to	contribute	a	lower	rate	of	14%.	Thus,	decisions	made	by	the	
Corporate	Trustee	in	conjunction	with	the	Scheme	Actuary	(Mercers,	then	and	until	2020),	
instead	of	showing	caution,	permitted	employers	to	underpay.	The	purported	grounds	were	
reported	to	be	the	surplus,	which	itself	should	have	been	treated	with	great	caution	because	of	
the	change	in	accounting	methodology.		
The	USS	Trustee	thus	failed	to	properly	protect	the	interests	of	Scheme	members	in	this	time	of	
obvious	economic	instability472	including	its	expected	impact	on	pension	funds.	The	presence	of	
a	notional	surplus	in	an	overinflated	market	was	instead	misused	to	justify	a	reduction	in	
employer	contributions.	More	recently	responses	from	USS	CEO	Bill	Galvin473	to	a	campaign	of	
complaints	from	members	regarding	historical	underpayments,	do	not	clarify	whether	any	
precautionary	mechanisms	were	put	into	place	at	the	time,	to	ensure	that	employers	were	
bound	to	a	commitment	to	make	good	any	such	underpayments	in	adverse	circumstances	(for	
example,	where	the	valuation	might	turn	out	to	have	been	over-optimistic).		
	
Even	in	the	absence	of	a	planned	safety	net	for	this	specific	decision,	pension	fund	trustees	are	
required474	to	monitor	the	schemes	on	an	ongoing	basis.	To	do	so	they	may	undertake	a	range	of	
activities	including	interim	valuations,	reviews	of	positions	and	assessment	of	rates	of	
contribution.	At	the	time	of	the	valuation,	that	crash	could	and	perhaps	should	have	been	a	
trigger	for	re-evaluating	fund	management	decisions	including	the	effects	on	the	fund	of	the	
change	in	accounting	methodology.		
	
That	the	valuation	was	approved	by	the	Board	on	23rd	March	2000,	is	perhaps	the	biggest	sign	
of	wilful	blindness,	in	that	by	this	time,	the	dot	com	bubble	had	burst,	and	it	would	have	been	
obvious	to	Board	members	that	the	mark	to	market	valuation	of	the	portfolio	as	at	31st	March	
1999	bore	little	resemblance	to	real	prices	after	the	bubble	had	burst.		
	
The	2002	valuation		
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Moving	forward	to	the	next	triennial	valuation	in	2002,475	the	Scheme	still	enjoyed	a	positive	
cashflow,	but	the	notional	surplus	had	diminished.	What	is	more,	this	surplus	had	depleted	
much	more	quickly	than	anticipated.	In	fact,	the	main	section	surplus,	which	had	been	expected	
to	last	over	11	years	at	the	reduced	employer	contribution	rate,	had	instead	dropped	rapidly	
from	£606.4mn	to	£87mn	in	just	3	years	(the	overall	deterioration	in	surplus	was	from	
£1443mn	to	£162mn;).	This	should	have	set	off	alarm	bells	for	the	Trustee.	Instead,	a	misjudged	
decision	was	taken	to	erode	a	significant	proportion	of	what	remained	of	the	notional	buffer.		
With	the	consent	of	the	Scheme	actuary,	employer	contribution	rates	were	maintained	at	14%,	
even	though	this	figure	continued	to	be	below	the	contribution	rate	required	by	the	actuarial	
valuation,	which	calculated	14.25%	with	respect	to	future	service.	Given	the	experiences	of	the	
changes	in	financial	markets	valuations	and	the	significant	erosion	of	the	investment	return	
component	of	the	fund,	this	decision	is	of	significance,	particularly	given	that	the	conclusion	of	
the	valuation	was	that	the	Scheme	was	only	just	on	an	even	keel:	‘the	assets	of	the	Scheme	at	the	
valuation	date	were	101%	of	the	accrued	liabilities	based	on	projected	Pensionable	Salaries’.	At	
a	time	when	the	sustainability	of	investment	returns	was	clearly	in	doubt,	this	decision	to	
maintain	an	artificially	low	employer	contribution	rate	could	be	seen	as	a	failure	to	properly	
protect	the	interests	of	beneficiaries.	Considering	that	a	DB	fund	relies	on	both	contributions	
and	investment	returns	to	sustain	itself,	the	fall	in	investment	returns	should	have	necessitated	
a	rethinking	of	the	continuation	of	artificially	low	employer	contribution	rates.				
	
	
The	2005	valuation		
Data	provided	at	the	next	triennial	valuation	in	2005476	confirms	that	this	was	a	risky	strategy,	
with	a	deficit	of	over	£6.5bn	accruing	as	a	result.	This	took	the	overall	valuation	of	the	fund	from	
an	£87mn	surplus	in	2002	to	a	£6.5bn	deficit	three	years	later.	The	2005	actuarial	valuation	
notes	that	the	‘assets	of	the	scheme	at	the	valuation	date	were	77%	of	the	accrued	liabilities	
based	on	projected	pensionable	salaries	with	a	past	service	deficit	of	£6,568	million’.	This	was	a	
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natural	result	of	investment	returns	that	were	around	£3bn	below	expectations.	In	spite	of	this,	
and	the	fact	that	the	actuarially	determined	rate	was	now	calculated	to	be	14.3%,	employer	
contributions	were	allowed	to	remain	at	14%.	Member	contributions	remained	unchanged.		
Subsequent	member	complaints	
In	2018,	several	USS	members	wrote	to	the	corporate	Trustee	to	ask	for	details	about	the	period	
of	employer	underpayments,	and	to	highlight	concerns	about	the	role	that	underpayments	
played	in	causing	the	deficit	that	in	turn	was	being	used	to	support	the	move	from	DB	to	DC.	
This	was	then	shared	with	other	members	through	electronic	and	other	communications	during	
the	period	of	UCU	industrial	action.			
Rather	than	the	typical	process	in	any	financial	services	firm,	of	complaints	handlers	
acknowledging	or	responding	to	the	request,	(once	the	issue	became	more	public),	a	few	
months	later	USS	CEO	Bill	Galvin	responded477	on	behalf	of	USS	in	a	letter	that	was	later	made	
public	on	the	USS	website.	In	it	Galvin	did	not	comment	about	whether	concrete	assurances	
were	taken	by	USS	from	employers	so	as	provide	an	adequate	buffer	for	adverse	circumstances.	
There	is	also	little	evidence	in	the	letter	of	USSL	sending	warnings	to	members	of	the	potential	
detrimental	consequences	of	prolonged	underpayment	by	employers.		
	
	
Commentary	regarding	Trustee	conduct	in	relation	to	underpayments	
The	Trustee’s	repeated	prioritisation	of	the	employers’	preferences	in	these	three	periods	offers	
certain	warning	signs.	Trustees	have	a	duty	to	protect	and	prioritise	the	interests	of	members.	
Given	the	lack	of	Trustee	resistance	to	continuing	low	employer	contribution	rates,	the	Trustee	
will	find	it	hard	to	demonstrate	that	members’	interests	were	adequately	protected.	Through	its	
decisions	on	contributions	rates,	the	Trustee	appears	to	have	actively	eroded	any	buffers	that	
might	provide	the	Scheme	members	with	comfort	in	times	of	distress.	At	the	time	of	writing	this	
chapter,	it	has	been	made	clear	by	an	independent	crowd-funded	activist	group	(Academics	for	
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Pensions	Justice),	that	a	conservative	QC	has	agreed	that	union	members	have	a	valid	case	
against	USSL	for	breach	of	trust.478		
There	is	no	publicly	available	evidence	of	any,	let	alone	substantive,	clear	or	candid,	
consultation	by	the	Trustee	alerting	members	to	this	disproportionately	swift	deterioration	of	
the	purported	surplus,	or	raising	red	flags	about	the	potential	detriment	to	members	and	the	
potential	inter-generational	unfairness	of	changes	to	the	Scheme	that	might	be	necessitated	by	
allowing	employers	to	allow	their	underpayments	to	be	cross-subsidised	by	a	supposed	surplus.	
Nor	is	it	clear	from	any	publicly	available	information,	given	the	actuarial	mandates	for	higher	
employer	contributions,	why	the	Trustee	did	not	pursue	employers	more	effectively	to	maintain	
their	contributions	at	the	appropriate	level	suggested	in	the	valuation	by	the	Scheme	Actuary.	It	
can	be	conjectured	that	Trustees	may	have	simply	fallen	in	with	what	they	perceived	to	be	the	
employers’	preference	(which	was	always	below	the	actuarially	mandated	rate	of	employer	
contribution),	putting	downward	pressure	on	the	Scheme’s	assets.	
The	Trustee	also	appears	to	have	reverse-engineered	the	required	contribution	rate	to	what	
was	seen	as	a	rate	within	the	employers’	preferred	range	of	contribution	rates.	Comments	on	
page	ii	of	the	actuaries’	covering	letter	for	the	2005	valuation479	suggest	that	another	guiding	
force	for	the	mis-named	‘Maximum	Funding	Requirement’	(not	a	maximum	level	for	funding	at	
all	but	essentially	a	threshold	at	which	the	USS	pension	fund	would	begin	to	lose	tax	rebates),	
may	have	also	been	one	of	the	driving	forces	in	guiding	conventional	actuarial	wisdom.480	It	is	
also	clear	that	it	drove	employer	preferences	at	a	time	when	the	Scheme	was	a	balance-of-costs	
Scheme	i.e.	employers	who	would	have	previously	been	content	with	building	a	surplus	as	this	
offered	them	tax	efficiency	on	their	investments,	now	wished	to	benefit	from	the	purported	
surplus	and	reduce	costs,	while	a	broader	agenda	of	marketization	of	higher	education	began	to	
gain	an	early	foothold.	Given	that	it	was	a	balance-of-costs	Scheme,	this	ostensibly	led	to	an	
openness	by	USSL	executives	to	wearing	down	the	surplus	in	order	to	allow	employers	to	
achieve	tax	efficiency	given	that	larger	surpluses	in	the	pension	Scheme	were	attracting	the	
attention	of	tax	authorities,	and	the	broader	narrative	economically	was	one	of	markets	
booming	and	pension	funds	achieving	good	results	for	employers	in	this	context.	This	was	
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achieved	at	an	industry	level	by	allowing	employers	to	benefit	from	the	estimations	of	buoyant	
markets.481		
In	this	USS	case,	this	was	a	particularly	egregious	blunder	because	any	such	surplus	was	an	
illusory	or	phantom	surplus	purely	caused	by	accounting	mechanics	resulting	from	a	change	in	
accounting	methodology	as	explained	above.	In	effect,	to	help	ensure	that	the	Scheme	continued	
to	be	tax-exempt,	the	Trustee	called	on	the	purported	surplus.	This	was	first	done	initially	at	a	
time	when	the	surplus	was	exaggerated	purely	as	a	result	of	changes	to	accounting	methods.	
This	then	precipitated	a	serious	deficit	when	the	over-inflated	asset	values	corrected	
themselves.	Employers	benefitted	from	being	able	to	underpay,	while	USSL	executives	were	
able	to	benefit	from	appearing	to	show	as	much	largesse	to	employers	as	other	pension	fund	
managers	and	trustees.	This	demonstrates	their	fundamental	lack	of	regard	for	risks	to	the	
Scheme	and	its	beneficiaries.	All	the	while,	attention	was	paid	to	the	short-term	financial	
interests	of	employers	and	to	the	interests	of	those	managing	the	fund.	The	fact	that	even	in	a	
balance-of-costs	Scheme,	it	is	the	members’	interests	that	are	the	subject	of	the	USS	Trustee’s	
duty,	makes	their	behaviour	worth	noting.482		
The	USS	CEO,	Bill	Galvin	appears	to	be	both	dismissive	and	cavalier	in	his	response483	to	the	
genuinely	held	concerns	of	members.	He	subverts	any	meaningful	discussion	by	noting	that	
‘historically,	employer	contribution	rates	have	not	been	particularly	relevant	for	members	as,	
prior	to	2011	(when	the	concept	of	cost-sharing	was	first	introduced	by	stakeholders	via	the	
Joint	Negotiating	Committee),	their	contribution	rate	was	fixed’.	This	consideration	of	members’	
interests	would	be	essential	in	order	for	the	USS	Trustee,	and	Bill	Galvin	as	CEO	of	USS	Ltd,	to	
fulfil	the	duty	to	Scheme	beneficiaries.484		
USS	Ltd’s	failure	to	challenge	the	employers’	desire	for	continued	underpayments	reflects	the	
Trustee’s	practice	of	paying	attention	to	employers’	interests,	as	advocated	by	the	employers’	
representation	bodies	(UUK	and	the	Employers	Pension	Forum,	or	EPF).	Anecdotal	evidence	
suggests	that	until	the	strike	of	2018,	the	vast	majority	of	Scheme	members	appear	to	have	been	
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unaware	of	these	drops	in	contributions	and	the	adverse	effect	on	the	Scheme	position.	Instead,	
UUK,	the	EPF	and	USS	have	insisted	that	the	deficit	represents	a	crisis	in	need	of	rapid	
resolution,	while	glossing	over	their	historic	role	in	allowing	it	to	be	created	over	the	course	of	
several	valuations.	This	shows	a	fundamental	and	continuing	disregard	for	the	interests	of	
scheme	beneficiaries.	Questions	have	also	been	asked	about	the	role	of	the	trustees	nominated	
by	the	union,	although	they	were	only	a	minority	of	the	Board.		
There	is	also	a	lack	of	acknowledgement,	on	the	part	of	the	employers,	of	the	role	they	played	in	
eroding	the	fund	in	a	reckless	manner	during	the	period	of	the	underpayments.	There	is	no	
recognition	whatsoever	that	this	may	in	any	way	have	contributed	to	the	position	the	fund	is	in	
now.	This	mirrors	responses	by	top	bankers	such	as	HBOS	CEO	Andy	Hornby	to	the	Global	
Financial	Crisis	of	2007	when	he	put	the	causes	of	the	crisis	down	to	happenstance.485	In	fact,	in	
a	tweet	dated	26th	of	March	2018,	responding	to	allegations	of	underpayment,	USS	employers,	
represented	by	the	lobbying	body	Universities	UK	attempted	to	justify	the	underpayments	by	
pointing	out	that	they	‘carried	on	paying	a	substantial	contribution	of	14%	of	salaries’.486	This	
echoed	Bill	Galvin’s	comments	cited	above	that	there	was	nothing	untoward	in	the	
underpayments	at	all.	On	a	subject	such	as	pensions,	such	framing	can	have	particularly	
pernicious	consequences.	This	is	because	pensions	are	a	fairly	complex	topic	and	many	
members	would	expect	to	rely	on	the	expertise	of	fiduciaries	on	such	issues.	In	particular,	
Galvin’s	framing	helps	quiet	the	moral	and	political	outrage	that	such	harm	might	otherwise	
inspire.	It	therefore	appears	cynically	and	cleverly	crafted	to	undercut	any	public	pressure	that	
might	be	mounted	to	induce	regulatory	or	parliamentary	scrutiny	of	the	employer	
underpayments	and	USS	Limited’s	own	role	in	permitting	it.	It	also	seeks	to	prevent	any	
restorative	justice	that	might	be	induced	from	such	pressure.		
Manufacturing	consent:	Deficits,	risk	and	de-risking		
Drawing	on	the	discussion	within	the	financial	crisis	chapter	which	explored	the	ways	in	which	
the	discourse	on	risks	and	their	management	can	be	financialized,	this	segment	of	the	case	
study	examines	the	creation	of	artificial	deficits	and	the	use	of	so-called	‘de-risking’.	It	has	been	
implied	by	employers	and	by	the	USS	Trustee,487	on	multiple	occasions,	that	this	de-risking	
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removes	risks	to	the	Scheme	and	the	natural	assumption	in	general	discussion	is	that	by	
extension	all	stakeholders	of	the	Scheme	benefit	from	lowered	risks.	In	reality,	risks	to	Scheme	
members	and	civil	society	stakeholders	are	increased	by	the	adoption	of	what	one	expert	terms	
‘reckless	prudence’.488		Developing	ideas	discussed	within	the	seminal	work	of	Herman	and	
Chomsky	(1998),489	this	section	explains	how	a	manufactured	deficit	and	associated	discussions	
of	acceptable	and	unacceptable	levels	of	risk,	are	used	to	shape	the	narrative	on	how	risks	are	
distributed	between	employers	and	controllers	of	finance	capital	vis-à-vis	pension	scheme	
members	and	civil	society.	The	section	documents	how	approaches	to	de-risking	within	USS	can	
counter-intuitively	increase	risks,	particularly	to	members	of	the	pension	scheme.	It	also	
documents	how	risks	are	actually	exacerbated	by	the	regulator	only	engaging	with,	and	being	
interested	in	risks	to	a	very	narrow	set	of	stakeholders.		
TPR	and	public	interest	rationales	for	pensions	regulation	
Pensions	are	extremely	large	institutional	aggregators	and	mobilisers	of	long-term	savings.	
Open,	immature	defined	benefit	pension	schemes	offer	a	valuable	source	of	security	for	citizens	
in	retirement.	They	also	have	a	fairly	infinite	investment	horizon	and	therefore	also	offer	a	
valuable	source	of	long	term	capital	for	investment	in	the	real	economy.	Well-managed	pension	
funds	can	enhance	or	erode	stability	in	the	economy	through	the	way	their	assets	and	liabilities	
are	managed.	A	pensions	regulator	motivated	by	public	interest	objectives	should	therefore	
typically	be	cognisant	of	the	effects	that	pensions	have	on	a	wider	range	of	stakeholders,	
including	notably	pension	scheme	members	and	civil	society	stakeholders.		
The	statutory	objectives	of	TPR	are:	
• to	protect	the	benefits	of	pension	scheme	members	
• to	reduce	the	risk	of	calls	on	the	Pension	Protection	Fund	(PPF)	
• in	relation	to	the	exercise	of	its	functions	under	Part	3	only,	to	minimise	any	adverse	
impact	on	the	sustainable	growth	of	an	employer	
• to	promote,	and	improve	understanding	of,	the	good	administration	of	work-based	
pension	schemes,	and	
• to	maximise	compliance	with	the	duties	and	safeguards	in	the	Pensions	Act	2008’.490	
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An	interest	in	protecting	the	‘benefits	of	pension	scheme	members’	is	first	on	the	list	suggesting	
that	the	regulator	does	have	a	clear	duty	towards	members	of	pension	schemes.	In	reality,	while	
this	is	mentioned	as	the	first	of	the	statutory	objectives,	TPR’s	interpretation	of	this	objective	
has	largely	in	practice	been	focussed	on	protecting	accrued	benefits,	rather	than	on	ensuring	
sustainable	ongoing	benefits	that	provide	retirement	security	and	a	viable	defined	benefit	
pension	scheme	for	all	members	(in	the	way	the	term	members	is	defined	by	TPR)	including	
potential	new	joiners	to	the	scheme.	TPR’s	emphasis	on	protecting	benefits	of	pension	scheme	
members	is	therefore	being	interpreted	in	the	context	of	its	second	statutory	objective,	which	is	
to	ensure	that	the	PPF	is	protected.	Such	protection	against	calls	on	the	public	purse	inherently	
offers	certain	protections	to	taxpayers,	but	as	described	below	must	be	weighed	up	against	
other	costs	to	the	same	taxpayers	or	citizens.	They	are	also	justified	in	terms	of	retaining	
confidence	in	the	financial	system	more	generally	and	pensions	savings	more	specifically.		
Examining	this	carefully,	this	level	of	focus	on	accrued	benefits,	while	useful	to	ensure	
guaranteed	pensions	are	paid,	is	largely	also	useful	for	two	things.	Firstly,	for	ensuring	there	is	a	
lower	likelihood	of	calls	on	the	public	purse	to	ensure	those	pensions	are	paid.	Secondly,	it	
subtly	sustains	a	pipeline	of	assets	under	management	by	the	pension	scheme	trustees	and	their	
appointed	investment	managers	i.e.	in	the	language	of	Epstein’s	definition	of	financialization,	to	
sustain	the	mechanism	via	which	financial	intermediaries’	business	interests	remain	protected.	
These	assets	under	management	would	continue	to	be	sent	the	financiers’	way	irrespective	of	
their	fund’s	true	performance,	through	the	imposition	of	mechanisms	such	as	automatic	
enrolments,491	and	as	long	as	the	pensions	paid	out	and	the	prevailing	wisdom/compulsion	is	
for	employers	and	employees	to	continue	to	invest	in	pensions.	Note	at	this	stage,	that	this	
would	apply	whether	or	not	these	were	defined	benefit	pensions	with	guaranteed	payments	in	
retirement	or	defined	contribution	pensions	without.	However,	there	is	little	evidence	of	TPR’s	
interest	in	ensuring	that	the	pension	schemes	can	meet	other	stakeholders’	(for	example,	
members’)	long-term	needs	such	as	for	security	in	retirement.		
The	TPR’s	preoccupation	with	the	PPF	and	ensuring	that	the	pensions	product	remains	is	
further	visible	in	how	they	specifically	outline	their	responsibilities	
	‘We	are	responsible	for:	
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• making	sure	employers	put	their	staff	into	a	pension	scheme	and	pay	money	into	it	
(known	as	‘automatic	enrolment’)	
• protecting	people’s	savings	in	workplace	pensions	
• improving	the	way	that	workplace	pension	schemes	are	run	
• reducing	the	risk	of	pension	schemes	ending	up	in	the	Pension	Protection	Fund	
• making	sure	employers	balance	the	needs	of	their	defined	benefit	pension	scheme	with	
growing	their	business’492	
This	emphasis	on	‘reducing	the	risks	of	pension	schemes	ending	up	in	the	Pension	Protection	
Fund’	carries	through	into	the	TPR’s	DB	Funding	Code,493	which	is	one	of	the	primary	pieces	of	
regulation	affecting	defined	benefit	pension	schemes.	This	is	because	the	funding	code	
determines	how	the	Scheme’s	assets	are	assessed			
A	review	of	the	Funding	Code,494	in	entirety,	for	the	purposes	of	this	paper,	suggests	that	TPR’s	
approach	to	appropriately	funding	DB	pension	schemes	is	also	fraught	with	the	presumption	
that	DB	Schemes	are	to	be	treated	either	as	mature	schemes,	or	as	schemes	that	employers	are	
expected	to	need	to	or	want	to	abandon.	A	combination	of	these	assumptions	and	prejudices	
against	DB,	and	the	emphasis	on	reducing	risks	to	the	Pension	Protection	Fund	results	in	TPR’s	
regulatory	approaches	to	funding	that	are	developed	with	the	presumption	that	Schemes	need	
to	be	what	is	termed	‘self-sufficient’	within	a	relatively	short	period	of	time.		
Practical	implications	of	the	regulatory	context		
This	emphasis	on	self-sufficiency	can	be	seen	as	a	heavily	prudent	way	-	consistent	with	the	
timeline	of	unwinding	a	typical	single	employer	fund	-	of	ensuring	there	is	little	risk	of	accrued	
benefits	being	paid	through	calls	on	the	PPF.	While	this	approach	to	Scheme	funding	may	be	
appropriate	in	certain	circumstances	or	for	a	single-employer,	mature	pension	Scheme,	it	is	
unjustifiable	for	a	multi-employer,	immature	pension	scheme	like	USS.		
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Povey	(2018)	points	out	that	‘Instead	of	making	use	of	the	real	returns	of	its	investments	and	
reducing	these	returns	to	allow	for	a	level	of	prudence	to	achieve	a	‘best	estimate’	of	expected	
returns’.495	TPR	(despite	publicly	denying	such	a	predisposition)	is	known	to	use	what	is	termed	
a	Gilts+	estimate.	This	figure	is	worked	out	using	the	notional	investment	required,	if	all	
investments	were	in	government	bonds,	to	estimate	the	cost	of	future	pensions.	The	use	of	
government	bonds	within	this	estimate	is	driven	by	the	belief	that	government	bonds	are	the	
safest	assets.	However,	given	the	trade-offs	between	risks	and	return,	it	is	clear	that	safe	assets	
such	as	government	bonds	provide	much	lower	returns	over	the	long-run	horizon	of	a	pension	
fund,	as	compared	to	equities	496	
Pensions	consultants	Hymans	Robertson	note	that	Gilts+	‘give	a	good	sense	of	the	cost	of	
matching	the	benefit	payments	with	one	of	the	lowest	risk	matching	assets.	They	are	also	a	
proxy	for	buy-out	costs	–	in	other	words,	the	cost	of	securing	all	scheme	liabilities	with	an	
insurer.	And	they	move	in	similar	ways.	There’s	no	getting	away	from	the	fact	these	are	an	
indicator	of	what	it	could	cost	a	scheme	to	largely	de-risk	and	deliver	benefits	with	a	low	risk	of	
members	losing	out.	For	sponsors,	it’s	the	price	of	exiting	from	the	DB	merry-go-round’.497		
What	the	regulator	is	implying,	by	asking	pension	fund	trustees	to	evaluate	the	Gilts+	figure,	is	
for	them	to	assess	how	much	it	would	cost	to	cover	the	liabilities	through	an	insurer	if	
employers	were	to	abandon	the	Scheme.	While	such	a	figure	might	be	worth	considering,	to	
assess	in	a	highly	conservative	manner,	the	buy-out	cost	of	a	closed,	mature	pension	Scheme,	
funding	valuations	to	be	guided	or	driven	by	this	metric,	overestimate	the	liabilities.	This	makes	
such	a	valuation	an	absurdity	in	the	case	of	USS	as	the	Scheme	is	open	and	immature.	It	is	even	
more	absurd	for	this	to	happen	when	the	Scheme	is	a	multi-employer	Scheme	with	the	covenant	
that	USS	has,	not	to	mention	USS’	associated	long-term	cash-flow	positive	status.		
Povey	(2018)	points	out	that	a	Gilts+	valuation	also	causes	serious	fluctuations	in	the	Scheme’s	
position	from	valuation	to	valuation.	Not	only	does	it	provoke	a	serious	system-wide	problem	
by	stimulating	an	artificial	demand	for	gilts	by	those	pension	schemes	seeking	to	‘de-risk’	by	
moving	more	of	their	portfolio	into	gilts	because	the	equities	they	currently	hold	are	perceived	
by	the	regulator	to	be	too	risky	(discussed	further	below),	it	also	creates	an	entirely	inordinate	
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focus	on	the	funding	deficit	that	the	Gilts+	valuation	artificially	creates	at	a	time	when	gilt	values	
are	artificially	inflated.	
An	expert	at	pensions	consultant	Hymans	Robertson	explains	that	‘Essentially	UK	pension	
schemes	seem	willing	to	pay	ever	higher	risk	premiums	for	gilt	assets,	meaning	demand	is	
running	way	ahead	of	supply”.	He	points	out	based	on	analysis	from	experts	at	Schroders,	that	
pension	schemes	own	80%	of	long-dated	index-linked	gilts	with	demand	vastly	outstripping	the	
market	by	a	ratio	of	five	to	one.	In	the	presence	of	increasing	demand	from	pension	funds	for	
this	kind	of	asset,	this	deficit	in	supply	coupled	with	a	hunger	for	these	assets	affects	how	much	
it	costs	to	source	them,	and	also	affects	investment	decision-making.	The	consultant	adds	that	
this	‘contributes	to	a	focus	on	the	balance	sheet	presentation	of	the	problem	–	in	other	words,	
the	deficits.’498	
For	a	fund	such	as	USS	that	is	open,	immature,	and	with	a	significant	investment	in	equities	that	
may	be	used	in	order	to	generate	the	necessary	levels	of	return	required	in	the	long-term	
without	taking	excessive	risks,	a	Gilts+	approach,	based	on	financial	economics	techniques	of	
discounting,	can	also	vastly	overestimate	the	deficit.	This	is	because	the	returns	are	artificially	
depressed	to	the	levels	of	those	achievable	by	gilt-yields,	rather	than	reflecting	the	returns	that	
could	be	generated	by	its	actual	portfolio	of	assets.	UUK	sought	to	capitalise	on	this	in	2017	by	
pretending	the	deficit	in	the	DB	plan	was	unsustainable.	It	sought	to	close	the	DB	scheme	on	
false	pretences.		
Broader	implications	of	funding	code	assumptions	
The	funding	code	is	intentionally	structured	to	suit	the	assumption	that	DB	pension	funds	are	
mature,	with	an	emphasis	on	self-sufficiency	and	in	unwinding	the	gilts+	deficits	within	a	short	
time	to	reduce	dependencies	on	sponsoring	employers	by	increasing	contributions	and	
changing	the	balance	of	assets.	This	appears	to	be	the	preferred	approach	of	the	regulator,	
although	there	are	notes	in	its	most	recent	funding	code	consultations	that	the	regulator	at	least	
acknowledges	that	such	an	approach	at	the	minimum	runs	the	risk	of	over-funding	and	‘trapped	
surpluses’.499		Later	within	the	same	document	they	reiterate	that	‘Our	view	is	that	the	risk	of	
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trapped	surplus	is	remote	and	manageable’.	500	The	framing	of	the	narrative	in	the	consultation	
pits	this	against,	what	is	specifically	depicted	as	the	risk	of	a	‘cliff-edge’.	501	The	following	table	
from	the	TPR’s	defined	benefit	code	of	practice	consultation,	discussing	technical	provisions	
within	open	DB	schemes,	illustrates	this	point.	
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Illustration	1:		
Option		
	
Pros		
	
Cons		
Same	approach	
as	closed	
schemes		
R 	
All	schemes	(open	and	closed)	are	treated	
consistently.		
R 	
If	an	open	scheme	were	to	close	to	new	entrants	or	
close	to	future	accrual	in	the	future,	its	TPs	would	be	
unchanged.	Therefore,	there	would	be	no	‘cliff-edge’	
effects	in	liabilities/deficits	associated	with	scheme	
closure.		
Q 	
Potential	for	over-
funding/	trapped	
surpluses	(if	scheme	
remains	open).		
	
Lower	TPs	as	
longer	
investment	
horizon		
	
R 	
Reflects	the	longer	investment	time	horizon	an	open	
scheme	has	compared	to	a	closed	scheme.		
	
Q 	
Inconsistent	treatment	
of	open	and	closed	
schemes.		
Q 	
Causes	a	‘cliff	edge’	
whenever	a	scheme	
closes	to	new	entrants	
and/or	future	accrual.		
Source:	Table	31	in	consultation	document	on	the	Defined	Benefit	Code	of	Practice	502	
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Due	to	its	narrow	financialized	interpretation	of	its	duties,	broader	public	interest	objectives	for	
a	good	pensions	regulator,	including	for	example	harnessing	resources	via	pensions	savings	as	a	
way	to	mobilise	productive	investment	in	the	real	economy,	are	not	explicitly	mentioned	in	the	
TPR’s	statutory	objectives.	They	also	do	not	appear	to	feature	in	meaningful	ways	in	key	
documents	such	as	the	DB	funding	code	or	the	recent	consultation	cited	above.	There	is	also	no	
evidence	of	regulatory	interest	in	any	elements	of	broader	economic	and	societal	detriment	
arising	from	large	pensions	funds	such	as	USS,	concentrating	their	investments	in	gilts,	i.e.	in	
lending	with	a	low-risk,	low-return	approach	that	might	not	be	suitable	for	the	investment	
needs	of	the	economy,	as	a	result	of	buying	gilts.	The	current	situation	is	therefore	reminiscent	
of	a	gilts	bubble	in	2006	when	pension	fund	demand	for	gilts	resulted	in	a	‘dramatic	fall	in	the	
real	yield	on	long-dated	gilts’.503	The	bursting	of	such	a	bubble	could	wreak	havoc	on	the	
sustainability	of	member	pensions,	but	would	also	create	economic	chaos,	due	to	the	role	of	
pension	funds	as	institutional	investors.	This	could	have	serious	transmission	effects	within	the	
real	economy.	Regulators	should	be	concerned	about	these	civil	society	implications.	However	
there	is	little	recognition	in	the	funding	code	of	the	view	that	pensions	are	only	as	sound	as	
productive	activity	in	the	economy	now.	There	is	also	little	understanding	of	the	broader	point	
that	pension	savings	must	be	invested	in	productive	real	economy	investments	in	order	to	
deliver	the	jobs	and	contributions	that	are	needed	to	pay	our	pensions	into	the	future.		
Manufacturing	consent		
In	their	seminal	work504	on	how	discourses	can	be	shaped	by	powerful	actors,	Herman	and	
Chomsky	(1998),	suggest	that	there	are	five	filters	in	the	transmission	of	information	via	the	
mass	media	to	civil	society	audiences.	The	original	filters	include	ownership,	advertising,	
sourcing,	flak	and	ideology.	Hermann	and	Chomsky’s	model	explained	the	use	of	these	filters	by	
American	media	to	determine	how	news	is	presented.	They	argued	that	those	with	power	and	
control	over	the	narrative,	can	determine	the	discourse.	This	allows	them	to	filter	out	topics	and	
opinions	that	are	considered	undesirable,	as	a	result	of	these	five	filters.	The	end	result	is	that	
alternative	ways	of	critically	engaging	with	the	issues	cease	to	exist	in	any	meaningful	way.	This	
case	study	does	not	specifically	examine	the	role	of	the	mass	media	in	transmitting	the	
dominant	ideology	of	neoliberal	market	capitalism.	Instead	it	applies	Herman	and	Chomsky’s	
work	to	how	the	narrative	about	the	pension	fund	is	controlled	and	shaped	by	three	different	
groups.	Firstly,	by	USSL,	due	to	its	role	as	the	Trustee	and	arbiter	of	information	to	members.	
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Secondly,	by	TPR,	which	as	the	regulator	is	seen	as	a	trusted	source	of	information	about	the	
health	or	otherwise	of	a	pension	fund.	Thirdly,	by	employers,	due	to	their	powers	to	
communicate	to	their	employees	about	the	affordability	or	otherwise	of	Defined	Benefit	
pensions.		
In	this	transposition	to	the	context	of	USS,	the	filters	have	the	following	meaning.	The	first	three	
of	Herman	and	Chomsky’s	five	filters	are	ownership,	advertising	and	sourcing.	Ownership	
relates	to	the	size	and	profit-seeking	attempts	of	those	in	the	media.	Advertising	relates	to	
stable	sources	of	revenue	required	by	media	organisations	to	cover	basic	costs.	Sourcing	refers	
to	the	symbiotic	nature	of	the	relationships	between	the	media	and	sources	of	information,	
which	intensify	economic	necessity	and	reciprocal	interest.	At	USS,	the	three	filters	tie	in	well	
with	noting	that	USSL	senior	management	are	incentivised	to	continue	a	productive	
relationship	with	the	employers.	This	is	because	employers	in	turn	appoint	a	significant	number	
of	Board	members	of	USS,	determine	the	larger	share	of	the	contributions	paid	into	the	fund	.	
Employers	can	also	therefore	influence	the	funds	under	management,	of	USS	Investment	
Management	(USSIM)	a	captive	investment	management	subsidiary	of	USS,	which	offers	a	
lucrative	bonus	structure,	not	inconsistent	with	the	asset	management	industry	more	generally.	
Senior	staff	at	USSL,	including	the	current	CEO,	share	a	revolving	door505	with	employers	and	
The	Pension	Regulator.	Concerns	about	funds	under	management	and	a	shared	approach	to	
questions	of	prioritisation	and	risk,	as	well	as	cognitive	regulatory	capture,	can	in	turn	
contribute	to	influencing	USSL	management	and	TPR	to	act	certain	ways	to	insulate	their	own	
future	salaries	and	bonuses.		
There	is	little	tolerance	of	dissent.	This	is	underlined	by	the	recent	removal	from	the	USSL	
Board	of	UCU	members’	representative	and	eminent	statistician	Professor	Jane	Hutton,	for	
daring	to	question	elements	of	the	way	in	which	deficits	were	being	determined.	Despite	
whistleblowing	to	the	TPR,	Professor	Hutton’s	views	only	came	to	light	after	she	was	dismissed	
by	USSL.506	Such	high-profile	attacks	on	dissenters	and	the	ruthlessness	with	which	they	are	
dealt	with,	further	entrenches	a	culture	of	self-censorship	by	those	in	both	Trustee	and	
regulatory	roles.	In	these	circumstances,	critical	contributions	that	question	the	fundamentals	
of	the	discourse	are	replaced	by	a	range	of	opinions	that	lie	within	an	acceptable	range	of	
dissenting	discourse	and	the	typical	critical	functions	performed	by	independent	trustees	and	
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regulators,	cease	to	have	meaning	and	depth.		This	mirrors	concerns	about	the	policing	of	
dissent	in	the	accounting	industry	through	the	use	of	lawfare	techniques,	as	explained	by	Sikka	
et	al.507		
It	is	the	employers’	interest	that	the	regulation	also	prioritises.	TPR	requires	USSL	to	formally	
consult	with	employers	in	a	meaningful	way,	with	respect	to	contributions	increases	for	
example,	as	a	relic	of	regulation	that	emphasises	the	responsibility	of	the	Trustee	to	the	
employer.	In	a	pension	fund	such	as	USS	where	costs	are	shared	65-35,	the	absence	of	
meaningful	consultation	with	members	further	undermines	a	duty	to	members.	Similarly,	TPR	
in	its	close	and	continuous	supervisory	relationship	with	a	high	impact	fund	like	USS	meets	with	
USSL	and	employers	on	a	regular	basis	(in	a	monthly	or	more	frequent	pattern).	The	meetings	
with	members	are	few	and	far	between,	with	the	members	representative	trade	union,	
University	and	College	Union	(UCU),	at	one	stage	highlight’ing	that	it	had	struggled	to	be	
permitted	one	meeting	with	a	regulator	in	a	period	of	over	24	months508.		
The	final	two	filters	in	Hermann	and	Chomsky’s	model,	flak	and	ideology	can	also	be	effectively	
transposed	to	this	context.	Flak	refers	to	negative	responses	by	powerful	forces	to	any	
dissenting	discussions	in	the	media.	These	criticisms	are	used	to	influence	the	media	and	
narrow	the	acceptable	range	of	discourse.	A	good	example	of	the	employment	of	flak	to	
suppress	dissent	amongst	Trustees	and	regulators	is	evident	in	the	discussions	of	the	
whistleblowing	by	Professor	Jane	Hutton.	In	a	letter509	11th	October	2019,	from	Professor	Sir	
David	Eastwood,	chair	of	USS	to	participating	USS	institutions,	flak	is	used	to	suppress	
discussion	of	the	substance	of	Professor	Hutton’s	allegations	around	the	misrepresentation	of	
the	USS	deficit.	Instead	Prof	Eastwood’s	letter	seeks	to	cast	doubts	about	Professor	Hutton’s	
professional	competence	by	suggesting	she	did	not	discharge	her	duties	as	a	Trustee	in	the	
manner	expected.			
Ideology,	the	final	filter,	is	used	to	exploit	public	concerns	and	distrust	to	legitimise	narratives	
preferred	by	powerful	interests.	These	involve	the	deployment	of	anti-ideologies	to	change	the	
narrative	and	draw	attention	away	from	the	core	of	the	issues	being	considered,	into	an	
irrational	discussion,	based	on	fear	and	mistrust.	In	addition	to	the	vilification	of	Hutton	
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described	above,	this	filter	is	exemplified	by	the	language	intentionally	used	by	both	
employers510	and	Prof	Sir	David	Eastwood	as	chair	of	trustees,	pointing511	to	the	chaos	and	
anarchy	that	would	be	caused	within	the	sector	including	the	possibilities	of	redundancies	and	
large-scale	cutbacks,	if	de-risking	were	not	immediately	carried	out	in	the	way,	they	would	
prefer.	For	example,	Universities	UK	in	a	February	2018	letter	note	that	‘If	an	increase	in	
employer	contributions	were	to	be	imposed,	funding	would	have	to	be	found	from	elsewhere	in	
university	budgets	–	from	teaching	and	research,	from	staffing	costs	and	from	student	services.	
It	could	lead	to	widespread	redundancies,	hurting	both	staff	and	students.	And	there	would	be	
no	guarantee	that	the	scheme	would	be	in	a	more	stable	place	at	the	next	valuation,	leading	to	
further	cost	increases,	more	significant	reductions	in	future	pension	benefits,	and	more	cuts’.	512	
The	emotive	choice	of	language	is	clearly	not	intended	to	be	an	honest	discussion	of	facts,	but	a	
whipping	up	of	sentiment	based	on	the	ideological	position	being	presented	as	such,	so	as	to	
allow	for	fear	to	be	sown	about	contrary	views	proposed	by	the	UCU.	
How	deficits	calculated	using	Gilts+	approaches	affect	the	USS	pensions	discourse	
Using	Herman	and	Chomky’s	model513	discussed	above,	a	manufactured	deficit,	can	be	
perversely	marshalled	within	the	discourse	to	achieve	the	hidden	aims	of	powerful	actors.	In	
the	case	of	USS	pensions,	the	Gilts+	approach	has	been	used	very	effectively	to	erode	and	cause	
the	beginning	of	the	end	for	Defined	Benefit	provision.	This	has	been	done	in	three	main	ways.		
Firstly,	the	calculation	of	deficits	using	the	Gilts+	methodology	has	caused	the	deficits	to	appear	
worryingly	large	at	every	valuation	in	the	triennial	valuation	cycle.	This	means	that	the	
valuations	have	moved	away	from	acting	as	opportunities	for	small	course	corrections	as	they	
are	intended	to	be,	but	instead	have	a	significantly	higher	effect	on	the	long-term	viability	of	the	
pension	fund.	Soederberg	(2014),514	in	her	analysis	of	how	debt	and	poverty	reinforce	each	
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other	explains	how	poverty	is	entrenched	by	policies	that	justify	exploitation	of	the	poor	
because	those	offering	credit	to	the	poor	adopt	a	flawed,	financialised	logic	in	a	microcosm	to	
justify	excessive	interest	rates,	which	then	all	but	guarantee	further	entrenchment	of	debt	and	
poverty.	Similarly,	a	narrative	of	thrift,	rational	behaviours	by	employers	and	prudence	
accompanying	discussions	of	the	deficit	has	helped	to	legitimise	extremely	draconian	and	
unjustified	measures	based	on	limited	evidence.	These	measures	have	evolved	over	a	very	short	
space	of	time	given	the	significance	of	potential	impact	of	such	changes	on	members,	and	given	
the	broader	evidence	of	USS’	positive	cashflow	stretching	into	the	long-term.	In	the	case	of	USS,	
this	narrowing	of	the	narrative	to	purely	focus	on	the	deficit	was	particularly	acutely	obvious	in	
the	discussion515	of	the	changes	that	were	announced	in	2017	to	change	the	Scheme	from	a	DB	
Scheme	to	a	DC	Scheme.	The	deficit	in	this	case	was	intended	to	absolve	employers	of	their	
responsibilities	of	the	Scheme,	using	a	spurious	narrative	of	the	Scheme	being	in	financial	
difficulties	and	therefore	needing	to	change	form.		
Secondly,	an	argument	has	been	advanced	that	the	deficit	causes	too	much	risk	to	sponsoring	
employers,	and	also	creates	uncertainty	in	terms	of	their	ability	and	the	ability	of	the	fund	to	
sustain	not	just	pensions,	but	jobs,	research	and	allied	work	in	the	longer	term.516	This	has	
prompted	some	employers	to	consider	leaving	the	Scheme,	thus	eroding	the	mutuality,	
discussed	further	above	that	provides	a	great	source	of	stability	to	the	Scheme.	For	example,	in	
May	2019,	Trinity	College	Cambridge,	one	of	the	wealthiest	employers	with	a	very	small	
membership,	left	the	Scheme	despite	having	to	pay	a	price	estimated	at	circa	£30mn,	which	was	
a	very	questionable	way	of	insuring	against	risks.517		
The	size	of	the	deficit	in	these	triennial	valuations	has	also	prompted	the	decision	that	such	
risks	must	be	removed	through	de-risking.	This	de-risking	has	been	conceived	by	USS	as	
operating	through	its	investment	strategy.	The	objective	is	to	remove	the	investment	risks	that	
might	be	created	by	the	uncertainty	in	relation	to	self-sufficiency	caused	by	the	Scheme’s	
investment	in	equities.	This	is	then	achieved	by	USS	by	making	supposedly	prudent	investment	
strategy	choices	to	replace	equity-style	investments	by	debt-style	investments.	Despite	the	fact	
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that	this	introduces	more	risks518	for	members	of	the	pension	scheme	because	the	move	to	debt	
instruments	actually	reduces	the	rates	of	return	and	increases	the	longer-term	risks	of	non-
payment	of	pensions,	this	strategy	is	considered	to	be	de-risking,	because	it	removes	the	
uncertainty	in	the	investment	performance	of	the	assets.	Debt	instruments	provide	greater	
certainty,	even	if	that	certainty	is	of	lower	return.	This	circular	logic	in	turn	leads	to	the	Scheme	
appearing	more	financially	unsustainable,	and	posing	inordinate	risks	to	members	and	
employers,	which	in	turn	prompts	further	de-risking,	exacerbating	the	problems.		
The	broader	marketised	context	of	higher	education	provides	the	impetus	for	employers	to	
support	this	de-risking	strategy,	because	their	pensions	liabilities	appear	less	volatile	on	their	
balance	sheets,	when	the	deficit	appears	less	volatile.	The	removal	of	volatility	then	makes	them	
appear	to	have	more	manageable	liabilities	on	their	balance	sheet.	This	management	of	deficit	is	
then	turned	into	the	discourse	of	employers	being	prudent	and	needing	to	close	Defined	Benefit	
schemes	because	the	risks	are	too	high.519	This	plays	into	the	hands	of	those	who	see	this	as	a	
good	way	to	legitimise	jettisoning	DB	pension	liabilities	within	their	balance	sheets,	so	as	to	free	
up	their	balance	sheet	for	the	kinds	of	speculative	real	estate	and	capital	markets	transactions	
that	are	associated	with	the	marketised	university.520		
Thirdly,	an	argument	has	been	made	that	increased	contributions	need	to	be	paid	by	both	
employers	and	members,	in	the	short-term	–	again,	on	the	pretext	that	long-term	funding	
targets	need	to	be	met	–	thus	feeding	the	narrative	DB,	is	‘too	expensive’	or	is	even	
‘unaffordable’	for	sponsoring	employers	or	for	members,	even	in	the	shorter	term	and	therefore	
drastic	change	needs	to	cut	in	immediately.521	The	USS	Joint	Expert	Panel	notes	that	the	USS	
opt-out	rates	are	‘considerably	higher	than	the	national	average’522.	This	seems	like	a	
counterintuitive	position	for	potential	members	of	a	healthy,	growing,	unique	DB	Scheme	to	
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take.	Employers’	communications	which	often	seek	to	highlight	the	size	of	the	deficit.	The	
presence	of	a	deficit	and	the	increasing	contributions	unsurprisingly	create	a	spectre	of	
uncertainty	for	members	and	have	an	impact	on	factors	such	as	opt-out	rates.	These	
communications	do	not	however	contextualise	that	a	pensions	deficit	is	a	modelled	estimation	
of	the	circumstances	in	the	future,	and	that	while	the	Scheme	is	cash-flow	positive,	this	
estimation	may	not	reveal	the	whole	picture	of	USS’	financial	health.		Employers	have	also	
created	targeted	communications	to	emphasise	their	contributions	to	the	Scheme	that	cherry-
pick	data	to	illustrate	how	much	they	are	paying	into	the	Scheme523.	This	then	results	in	scaring	
members	into	leaving	the	scheme	assuming	it	will	fail	or	in	making	the	Scheme	too	expensive	
for	lower-paid	members,	thus	ensuring	many	who	would	otherwise	have	stayed	in	the	Scheme,	
feel	unable	to	continue.	This	direction	of	travel	has	been	evident	more	generally	with	DB	
pension	schemes	closing	to	new	accruals	or	to	new	members524	and	more	specifically,	
particularly	in	the	case	of	USS.525	
The	increases	in	risks	to	members	takes	place	in	a	context	where	there	is	grave	information	
asymmetry	between	marketised	employers,	retaining	highly	qualified	actuarial	advisors	and	
lobbyists	such	as	Universities	UK	to	advance	the	case	made	by	their	management	and	negotiate	
on	their	behalf.	This	superiority	in	small	groups	of	powerful	elites	(management	within	
employers	in	this	case),	causes	for	collective	action	problems	to	reinforce	the	manufacture	of	
consent	caused	by	a	financialised	assessment	of	risks.	This	assessment	not	just	prioritises	
financial	risks	that	are	of	importance	to	employers	but	prevents	a	discussion	of	the	holistic	
range	of	risks	that	might	apply	to	members	and	civil	society,	if	de-risking	through	increased	
exposure	to	gilts	for	example,	actually	reduces	risks	to	the	Scheme	as	a	whole.		
Conclusion	and	suggestions	for	further	research.		
This	chapter	looks	at	how	the	concept	of	risk	has	been	framed	in	Universities	Superannuation	
Scheme	(USS)	pension	dispute.	It	examines	some	of	the	history	of	USS,	right	up	to	the	present,	
examining	the	unprecedented	and	ongoing	dispute	which	has	had	such	a	significant	impact	on	
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higher	education.	The	chapter	reviewed	two	main	areas,	employer	underpayments	and	the	
strategy	of	de-risking.	Both	affected	the	health	of	the	Scheme.	The	case	study	adopts	
perspectives	from	different	disciplines	to	examine	how	the	understanding	of	risk	can	be	moved	
from	a	holistic	discussion	of	risk	to	a	narrow	conception	of	risk,	that	ignores	the	wider	arrays	of	
risk	posed	by	changes	to	the	management	of	funds	and	distribution	of	risks	within	the	pension	
scheme.	Adapting	Hermann	and	Chomsky’s	five	filters	model	to	the	discussion	of	de-risking,	the	
case	study	explores	how	powerful	elites	can	distort	narratives	and	suppress	dissent	so	as	to	
preserve	and	entrench	their	own	interest.	
The	chapter	shows	how	a	financialized	interpretation	of	risk	can	be	manipulated	to	privilege	
some,	while	creating	potential	detriment	to	others.	In	the	example	of	USS	this	reinforces	a	
lesson	from	the	GFC	that	financialization	places	‘more	aspects	of	economic	and	social	life	at	the	
risk	of	volatility	from	financial	instability	and,	conversely,	places	the	economy	and	social	life	at	
risk	of	crisis	from	triggers	within	particular	markets’.	526	
Suggestions	for	future	research	include	an	analysis	of	employer	communications	to	members	in	
the	context	of	Hermann	and	Chomsky’s	five	filters.	It	would	also	be	interesting	to	explore	how	
financialisation	can	create	and	reinforce	what	Soederberg527	has	(in	the	context	of	credit	
extension)	described	as	‘debtfare’.	Parallels	could	be	explored	in	relation	to	evisceration	of	
pensions,	particularly	in	the	context	of	high	levels	of	casualised	employment	within	Higher	
Education.528		
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Conclusion	
	
This	thesis	has	been	set	out	in	the	form	of	three	chapters,	that	traverse	disciplines	and	in	some	
ways	time	horizons	too.		
	
Chapter	one	looks	back	in	time	at	the	causes	of	the	global	financial	crisis	(GFC)	that	began	in	
2007.		When	the	GFC	originally	unfolded,	its	effects	were	devastating.	This	provided	a	strong	
case	for	a	radical	overhaul	of	the	system,	and	immediately	after	the	crisis,	such	change	was	
acknowledged	by	both	industry	insiders	and	civil	society	stakeholders	as	necessary.529	Yet,	over	
a	decade	after	the	crisis,	even	mainstream	financial	commentators	acknowledge	that	while	‘the	
stagflation	of	the	1970s	brought	a	counter-revolution	(when)	the	1980s	saw	a	radical	change	of	
ideas	on	the	role	of	the	state	and	markets,	the	goals	of	macroeconomic	policy	and	the	job	of	
central	banks’,530	the	GFC	has	not	brought	about	any	fundamental	transformation.	The	chapter	
critically	examines	each	of	the	causes,	and	identifies	the	levers	for	such	a	radical	overhaul.	It	
clarifies	the	need	to	conceive	risk	and	regulation	more	holistically,	so	as	to	go	beyond	simply	
conceiving	regulation	as	a	response	to	the	direct	financial	costs	of	risk	to	a	small	range	of	
stakeholders.	For	example,	the	dominant	component	of	the	discussion	post-crisis,	particularly	
within	regulatory	and	practitioner	circles,	was	framed	in	terms	of	protection	of	taxpayers	or	the	
direct	financial	costs	of	the	crisis,	rather	than	in	terms	of	the	broader	costs	(both	financial	and	
non-financial)	borne	by	civil	society,	as	a	result	of	the	crisis.	This	prevented	a	fuller	exploration	
of	the	range	of	harms	imposed	upon	civil	society.			
	
The	centrepiece	of	the	thesis	and	its	key	contribution	to	the	scholarly	literature	in	the	area	of	
financial	regulation,	is	chapter	2	that	uses	the	GFC	as	a	springboard	to	look	ahead	and	provide	a	
conceptual	basis	for	structurally	reforming	UK	financial	regulation.	The	chapter	focusses	on	the	
substantive	political	rationales	for	regulation,	within	the	public	interest	theories	of	regulation	
and	it	explains	how	conduct	regulation	should	and	could	be	animated	by	these	substantive	
political	rationales.	Looking	back	at	the	causes	of	the	crisis,	the	chapter	sets	out	the	evolution	of	
prudential	regulation	as	a	response	to	the	issues	highlighted	by	the	crisis.	Although	macro-
prudential	regulation,	as	a	concept,	has	been	discussed	since	the	1970s,531	regulatory	policy-
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makers,	particularly	in	the	UK,	have	traditionally	practised	prudential	regulation	in	the	form	of	
micro-prudential	regulation.532	Micro-prudential	regulation	has	been	justified	as	addressing	
systemic	risks	through	regulatory	oversight	to	ensure	that	financial	firms	at	a	more	
individualistic	level	were	able	to	either	honour	the	financial	claims	they	had	committed	to,	or	be	
unwound	without	distressing	the	system.	The	expectation	in	this	is	that	each	individual	entity	
being	financially	sound	would	enable	the	system	as	a	whole	to	be	sound	too.	Ad-hoc	thematic	
regulatory	interventions	and	somewhat	more	systematic	approaches	through	a	high-level	
approach	to	financial	stability533,	have	also	accompanied	this	micro-prudential	regulation.	The	
latter	have	taken	place	through	co-ordinating	mechanisms	between	Her	Majesty’s	Treasury,	The	
Bank	of	England	and	the	regulator.	The	GFC	has	proved	that	this	approach	to	prudential	risks	
was	unable	to	cope	with	systemic	risks	effectively.	Macro-prudential	regulation	adopts	a	more	
systematic	approach	to	regulatory	interventions	at	a	systemic	level.	Drawing	a	parallel	with	
macro-prudential	regulation,	the	chapter	highlighted	the	systemic	nature	of	conduct	risks.	It	
offered	the	rationale	and	structural	mechanism	for	a	cognitive	shift	in	the	way	conduct	
regulation	is	conceived.		
	
The	third	chapter	looks	at	how	the	notion	of	risk	was	and	is	framed	in	the	dispute	around	
changes	to	the	£74bn	Universities	Superannuation	Scheme	(USS).	It	is	an	exploration	of	the	
certain	elements	of	the	history	of	USS,	with	bridges	to	the	present,	examining	the	ongoing	
pensions	dispute	disrupting	higher	education.	The	chapter	reviewed	two	main	areas,	employer	
underpayments	and	the	strategy	of	de-risking	adversely	affecting	the	health	of	the	Scheme.	
Examining	the	narrative	around	each,	it	sets	out	how	a	financialized	interpretation	of	risk,	can	
be	harnessed	to	privilege	some,	while	creating	potential	hardship	for	others.	In	the	microcosm	
of	USS,	this	reinforces	a	lesson	from	the	GFC	that	financialization	places	‘more	aspects	of	
economic	and	social	life	at	the	risk	of	volatility	from	financial	instability	and,	conversely,	places	
the	economy	and	social	life	at	risk	of	crisis	from	triggers	within	particular	markets’.	534	
	
The	chapters	in	the	thesis	have	evidenced	the	role	of	financialization	as	the	catalyst	for	many	of	
the	socio-economic	and	democratic	challenges	that	are	faced	by	civil	society.	Financialization	
introduces	risks	not	just	to	financial	markets	and	the	real	economy,	but	also	to	democratic	
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debate	and,	as	a	result	to	citizens,	through	the	corruption	of	narratives	surrounding	the	reform	
that	is	sorely	needed	to	address	socio-economic	challenges	foisted	on	society	by	global	finance.	
In	doing	so,	the	thesis	seeks	to	concentrate	the	attention	of	scholars	on	the	insidious	role	that	
financialization	plays	in	subverting	genuine	regulatory	reform	particularly	after	crises.		
	
Each	of	the	chapters	intentionally	avoids	using	a	mono-disciplinary	lens.	Instead	the	chapters	
examine	problems	with	finance	by	marshalling	relevant	insights	from	the	work	of	scholars	
across	different	disciplines	to	develop	a	cross-disciplinary	vantage	point.	In	critically	examining	
and	carefully	selecting	these	insights,	the	thesis	seeks	to	have	as	its	motivation,	the	need	for	
finance	to	be	driven	by	the	needs	of	society	rather	than	creating	self-referential	mechanisms	
and	structures	that	entrench	socio-economic	barriers.	The	aim	is	to	squarely	and	critically	
confront	and	challenge	what	Tombs	(2015)	drolly	refers	to	as	‘the	non-ideological	work	of	the	
liberal	orthodoxy	(that	is)	highly	ideological	and	politicised’.535		
	
Directions	for	future	work	
Due	to	the	diversity	of	the	sources	and	the	multiplicity	of	intellectual	roots	that	they	are	drawn	
from,	the	analysis	within	the	thesis	offers	many	avenues	for	further	research	within	specific	
disciplines	or	in	integrating	multiple	disciplinary	strands.		
	
One	potential	avenue	for	study	relates	to	the	way	risk	transformation	is	conceived	within	the	
theory	of	financial	intermediation.	Within	the	study	of	qualitative	asset	transformation,	risk	
transformation	is	thought	of	as	being	an	adjunct	of	size,	maturity	or	liquidity	transformation.	
The	conceptualisation	of	financial	firms	solely	as	intermediaries	can	mask	the	role	that	financial	
firms	play	in	creating	new	risks.	Such	new	risks	are	introduced	as	a	result	of	their	size,	their	
ability	to	lobby,	or	to	make	campaign	contributions	that	alter	regulation,	their	power	in	shaping	
the	narrative	around	finance	and	so	on.	As	such	the	risks	that	they	introduce	are	not	solely	
attributable	to	their	role	in	purely	facilitating	the	economic	transactions	that	grease	the	needs	
of	society.	This	facilitative	role	however	has	traditionally	been	put	forward	as	the	justification	
for	their	prioritisation	within	rescue	packages.	In	grappling	with	the	role	of	financial	
intermediaries	in	introducing	or	creating	new	risks,	rather	than	just	being	valuable	conduits	of	
risk	arising	from	the	transformations	of	size,	maturity	or	liquidity,	societal	resources	could	then	
be	prioritised	in	different	ways	to	facilitate	any	rescues	in	times	of	failure.		
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Another	allied	area	of	study	developing	the	theory	of	financial	intermediation	could	be	framed	
around	the	role	of	banks	in	creating	risk	through	money	creation.	The	theory	requires	
significant	recalibration	because	more	recent	mainstream	evidence	and	acknowledgement	of	
longer-standing	works	of	scholars	including	Werner	(2014),536	many	contemporary	academic	
explorations	of	finance,	do	not	effectively	acknowledge	the	power	that	money	creation	affords	
banks,	and	how	this	in	turn	affects	democracy	and	policy	formation.	It	would	be	useful	to	re-
examine	and	reframe	this	using	the	updated	paradigms.	
	
On	a	separate	theme,	scholarly	work	in	the	area	of	regulation	could	be	developed	in	the	conduct	
regulation	space,	moving	away	from	a	marketised	and	financialized	framing	of	stakeholders	as	
consumers	or	providers	of	financial	services.	This	could	take	multiple	forms	–	particularly	in	
reframing	how	many	of	the	existing	checks	and	balances	against	risk,	reinforce	inadequacy	of	
citizen	protections	by	implementing	regulation	using	the	frame	of	consumer	protection.	It	
would	also	be	useful	to	explore	how	the	notion	of	vulnerability	may	be	expanded	in	the	context	
of	financialization	This	would	help	to	consider	and	re-balance	the	way	in	which	regulators	and	
regulation	contribute	to	ongoing	exploitation	of	the	vulnerable.	Further	work	is	also	required	in	
examining	the	role	of	regulators	in	perpetuating	the	violence	imposed	by	financial	hardship.	
This	could	be	developed	using	the	literature	related	to	social	harm.		
	
On	the	topic	of	USS,	there	is	significant	room	for	further	work	around	the	governance	and	
accountability	of	those	managing	this	pension	fund.	This	is	particularly	relevant	in	the	light	of	
the	exclusion	of	experts	who	provide	dissenting	views.	Such	work	could	be	developed	through	
the	use	of	information	obtained	through	Freedom	of	Information	requests	and	documents,	
previously	marked	as	confidential,	that	have	been	leaked	by	whistleblowers.	The	proliferation	
of	a	financialized	conception	of	education	as	a	result	of	concerted	action	by	the	Higher	
Education	(HE)	lobbying	bodies	such	as	Universities	UK	(UUK),	the	Employers	Pension	Forum,	
the	Universities	and	Colleges	Employers	Association	(UCEA)	and	that	of	university	vice-
chancellors	and	senior	managers,	is	another	interesting	avenue	for	future	study.		
	
More	broadly,	within	the	study	of	corporate	governance,	work	could	be	carried	out	in	relation	
to	whistleblowing,	expert	involvement,	citizen	fora	and	mechanisms	for	dissent,	that	allow	for	
greater	accountability	of	those	within	positions	of	power.	This	and	other	work	could	help	
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advance	scholarship	in	education,	corporate	accountability,	state	accountability,	financial	
regulation	and	criminology,	amongst	others.
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